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ABSTRACT
This thesis argues that Plotinus differentiates between time, which he identi-fies with the dispersive contemplation of Soul, and temporality, which is the onto-logical structure of sensible Nature. In the refutation of his predecessors, Plotinusshows why this distinction must be upheld: first, it ensures the conceptual consis-tency of the theory of time by taking into consideration that time must be prior tomotion; second, the distinction between time and temporality ensures the ontolo-gical unity of time by removing time from the realm of dispersed phenomena andgiving it the status of a principle of temporal phenomenality. Because time thereby mediates between the creative Soul and created phe-nomena, it takes on a vital role in the continuity of the emanation, the processionof Being. By relating the higher creative part and the lower created part of Soultime sits at the node of Soul‘s twofoldness and thereby ensures a continuous ema-nation of sensible Nature from the higher principles.
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
This thesis explores the theory of time advanced by Plotinus. In his treatise“On Eternity and Time” (Enn. III.7) Plotinus defines time as “the life (ζωή) of soulJ ) of soulin a movement of passage from one way of life (βíος) to another.”íος) to another.”Mος) to another.”) to another.”1 According toWerner Beierwaltes, βíος) to another.”íος) to another.”Mος) to another.” refers here to different stages or states (modi vivendi) orthe different phases of life in general, which are distinguished by what is beforeand  after;  ζωή) of soulJ ,  on  the  other  hand,  means  an  active  force  carrying  the  βíος) to another.”íος) to another.”Mος) to another.”.2Plotinus makes a subtle, yet crucial distinction between two different activities ormovements which are inherent in Soul and which constitute the nature of time.The active force, the ζωή) of soulJ  of Soul which precedes and carries the successive mo-ments of βíος) to another.”íος) to another.”Mος) to another.”, is what Plotinus calls “time.” In this thesis, I will argue that Plotinus draws a distinction between temporalsuccession (ἐQφἐξή) of soulT ς) to another.”) and time itself (χρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temoM νος) to another.”). I will show that, for Plotinus, tem-porality is the ontological structure of phenomenal reality, whereas time is the
principle  of this structure. Time, therefore,  transcends  temporality, since time isthe cause of  phenomenal  temporality.3 I  propose that  Plotinus’  conception has
1 Enn. III.7. 11. 42-45: “ΕἰQ οὖ[ ν χρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temoM νον λἐJγοἰ ψὖχή) of soulT ς) to another.” ἐQν κἰνή) of soulJ σἐἰ μἐταβíος) to another.”ατἰκῇT  ἐQξ αe λλοὖ ἐἰQς) to another.” αe λλον βíος) to another.”íος) to another.”Mονζωή) of soulf ν ἐἰ[ναἰ, α[ ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temʹ αh ν δοκοἰT τἰ λἐJγἐἰν;”2 Werner Beierwaltes,  Plotinus: Über Ewigkeit und Zeit (Enneade III, 7),  3.  erg. Aufl.  (Frankfurta.M.: Klostermann, 1981), 268.3 I  will  use the terms “transcendence” and “principle”  throughout  this thesis to describe thenature of time in Plotinus’ treatise. Therefore, some preliminary remarks on these terms are in or-der. By “principle” I mean “metaphysical cause.” In this sense, time is the principle of temporality
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both logical and ontological advantages because it ensures the conceptual consist-ency and ontological unity of time, and that Plotinus’ treatise – especially in its re -futation of his predecessors’ opinions – is structured around these advantages.Before I introduce the two advantages in more detail I need to briefly remarkon  our  common conceptions  about  time  and  why  they  might  be  problematic.Plotinus acknowledges that we usually associate time with movement or change.4This is not surprising; we are exposed to the temporal nature of the kosmos5 firstand foremost by the experience of change. All around us things are moving, theycome  to  be  and  cease  to  exist,  and  their  forms  change  constantly;  and  forourselves the most intimate experience of temporality is probably our own agingand eventual death. Obviously this ever-present change goes hand in hand withsome sort of temporal succession. The possibility of change requires that there bea  future,  for change implies that something was  first  in a certain situation and
because time  causes  the temporal structure of everything that appears. This causation is meta-physical because it does not appear itself, it is not a historical event but is, rather, at work at everysingle moment.For this reason, time as a principle is also transcendent. The term “transcendence” is problematicin the framework of this thesis, since the distinction between immanence and transcendence is notclear-cut in Plotinus. His layered ontology introduces various degrees of transcendence, on which Iwill touch but not elaborate in detail in this thesis. When I speak, therefore, of the transcendenceof time I mean only that time is beyond the phenomenal. It does not appear but is a principle of ap-pearance, in the sense I defined above.4 I often use the terms “movement,” “motion,” and “change” interchangeably when I talk aboutthe locomotion, qualitative, or substantial change of a phenomenon. Plotinus does know a kind ofmotion that is  not associated with change, namely the activities of the hypostatic realities. Time,the life of Soul, is one of these hypostatic activities. I will introduce the concepts of motion andactivity in greater detail later on in this thesis. 5 I use the term kosmos in the Greek meaning throughout the thesis. It is the ordered movementof the whole.
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then in a different one. The relation between time and movement is intuitive be-cause we necessarily experience them together. Yet, for the inquisitive mind thequestion  remains,  what  precisely  is this  relationship between time  and move-ment. Is movement the same as temporal succession? Or is time a measure of howswiftly or slowly a certain movement is progressing? Or maybe time is a certainaspect of change, which causes us to experience change and temporality the waywe do? All of these are opinions about time are held by ancient philosophers, andPlotinus deals with them, among others, in his treatise on the subject. His refuta-tions of other philosophers’  views are,  indeed, vital for understanding his owntheory. I propose, that Plotinus uses his predecessors to point out a (in his mind)common misconception about time: namely, that it is something that appears.6 Inhis analysis of these opinions then, he consistently points out how they all mis-place time in the phenomenal realm; in this way, he sets the stage for his own the-ory, which he believes solves problems of the refuted opinions. Plotinus conceptu-alizes time not as something belonging to phenomenal change but, rather, as thetranscendent principle thereof. 
6 By “appearance” here, I do not mean corporeal appearance. Time is not a sensible phenomenon– we cannot directly see, hear, smell, taste, or touch it. But, as I pointed out earlier, we inevitably
experience temporality when we experience change. In this way, we might be led to the conclusionthat time is something that belongs to appearances. This is what Plotinus thinks to be at the coreof all the misguided conceptions of time.
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I will argue, with Plotinus, that this account has two philosophical advant-ages. First, Plotinus ensures the conceptual consistency of his theory of time bygiving time ontological priority over all that is in time. Second, his theory of timeremains faithful to the unity of time and the continuity of our experience of tem-porality by identifying time with the continuous contemplative activity of Soul(the life of Soul) and temporality with the structure of the object of Soul’s contem-plation. First, Plotinus’ approach ensures the conceptual consistency of the theory oftime. Change presupposes time. Our experience of the flow of things coming andgoing in front of our eyes, and of the succession of thoughts in our minds requiresa concept of time prior to this experience. If we relate time too closely to phenom-enality we, therefore, run the risk of getting caught up in inconsistencies. Move-ment is  in time, we will see Plotinus saying, meaning that time must be prior tomovement because our experience of movement presupposes time. If we, there-fore, place time in the phenomenal realm, we end up with the problem that time is
in time. In other words, we are presupposing time in order to explain what time is,and fall into a circular argumentation. Plotinus solves this issue by proposing thattime transcends the phenomenal realm and asserting it to be a principle of phe-nomenality.Second, the distinction between phenomenal temporality and the principleof time ensures that the theory reflects the ontological unity of time. Our experi-
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ence of temporality is continuous; therefore, it is intuitive to assume that there areno gaps, no breaks in the flux of temporal succession. Yet, Plotinus argues thatsome of his predecessors’ theories are not faithful to this experience. Aristotle,who dedicates great effort to ensure that his theory reflects the continuity of time,is  a central  target  of  Plotinus’  criticism.  Aristotle  defines time as a number ofmovement. Plotinus criticizes this approach because he thinks that it breaks theunity of time into distinct moments which Aristotle fails to reconnect. Plotinus,again, solves the issue by introducing time as a transcendent principle removedfrom the phenomenal realm. Plotinus’ distinction between time and temporality is closely bound up withhis concept of Soul. For this reason, I will also briefly introduce this subject. Soulis the cosmological principle of dispersion in Plotinus’  layered ontology.  It  dis-perses the intelligibles, which are unified in the Intellect, by contemplating themdiscursively and, thereby, producing multiplicity. Time, for Plotinus, is preciselythis dispersive activity of Soul, which he calls the “life of Soul.” Plotinus, therefore,
identifies Soul’s discursive mode of contemplation with the dispersive activity that is
time. Yet, the multiplicity that Soul creates is not outside of Soul. Rather, Soul istwofold in her nature: at her upper end she is the lowest of the hypostatic realitiesand, therefore, a transcendent ontological principle. Yet, at her lower end she isidentified with her creations and disperses herself into multiplicity. I will begin
5
the second chapter of this thesis with a detailed explanation of Soul’s nature andactivity in Plotinus’ thought. I will argue that time sits at the node between Soul’supper summit and her lower creations. In this way, the unity of time is reflected inPlotinus’ theory. Time, as the contemplative activity of the hypostatic Soul, neverceases and is, thereby, continuous. Moreover, the temporality of the multiplicity inthe phenomenal realm is also continuous because it is constantly being createdthrough the contemplation of Soul. Hence, not only is the unity of time, as the life-activity of Soul, thereby ensured, but time is also the central concept that medi-ates the upper and lower ends of Soul. Time is the mode of Soul’s  contemplation;temporality is the structure of what is created through Soul’s contemplation. In sum, I argue that Plotinus’ treatise on time rests on two argumentationalpillars: a theory of time must be logically consistent and reflect the ontologicalunity  of  time.  Plotinus  achieves  logical  consistency  by  distinguishing  betweentemporality as the structure of phenomenal reality and time as the transcendentprinciple that creates this structure. To stay truthful to the ontological unity oftime Plotinus conceptualizes time as the contemplative activity of Soul and tem-porality as the mode of being of what Soul contemplates. Plotinus uses his prede-cessors’ opinions as a springboard to showcase why his own theory is superior.He argues  that  his  predecessors  all  place  time  within  the  phenomenal,  whicheither forces them into logical predicaments or destroys the unity of time. 
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In the first chapter of this thesis, I will provide a detailed interpretation ofPlotinus’ refutation of the opinions of his predecessors.  He identifies three differ-ent lines of thinking about time, which he will criticize:
either time is movement, as it is called, or one might say it is what ismoved, or something belonging to movement.7 
It sometimes does not seem quite clear whom Plotinus has in mind when hetalks about these “important statements.” The first one, which identifies time withmotion itself, was current in the early Academy.8 According to Gordon Clark, a fewStoics also held this view, although Zeno and others fall into another group.9 Thesecond view, which holds that time is the moved kosmos – the “sphere of the uni-verse”10 – is of Pythagorean origin.11 Finally, the third view, that time is somethingbelonging to  motion,  seems  to  be  the  most  important  one  for  Plotinus,  as  hespends a large portion of his treatise on that idea. First, time, which is supposed torelate somehow to motion, may be the interval of motion – the “distance covered.”This opinion is most importantly held by Zeno. Second, time could be the measureof motion, as it is famously defined by Aristotle. Lastly, time may be a consequence
7 Enn. III.7. 9. 18-19: “Ἢ γαf ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, tem κἰJνἐσἰς) to another.” ἡ λἐγομἐJνοή) of soul, ἣ τοf  κἰνοὖJ μἐνον λἐJγοἰ ἄν, ἣ κἰνή) of soulJ σἐωJ ς) to another.” τἰ τοf νχρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοJ νον.”8 Arthur H.  Armstrong,  Plotinus. On Eternity and Time (Enn III.7), in:  Plotinus: In six vols. Vol. 3.
Enneads III. 1-9, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), 318.9 Gordon Clark, “The Theory of Time in Plotinus,” The Philosophical Review 53, no. 4 (1944): 337.10 Enn. III.7. 23-24: “τοὖT  pαντοQ ς) to another.” ἂν σφαἰTρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temαν.”11 Ibid; Armstrong, Plotinus (Enn. III.7), 318.
7
of motion, as is said by the Epicureans.12 I will argue that Plotinus uses differentstrategies to criticize these opinions – and outlining these strategies will aid me incorroborating my claim that Plotinus splits the discussion of time in Ennead III.7into two parts: logical and ontological. For, indeed, the arguments that Plotinusemploys against several of the criticized opinions are purely logical – namely, thearguments  against  the  identification of  time  with  motion,  the  identification oftime with the moved, and Zeno’s theory of time as the interval of motion. Plotinusargues that there can be no concept of movement without presupposing a conceptof time. Hence, time cannot be identified with movement, nor with anything thatis moved. For nothing can move without there being a temporal succession priorto the movement, otherwise there would be nowhere for the thing to move to.Also, Zeno’s argument will be proven untenable, for it either implicitly identifiestime with movement once more, or it reduces temporality to spatiality, as Plotinusshows. After the refutation of all these opinions, Plotinus moves on to the view thattime is a number or measure of motion, as it was famously held by Aristotle. Here,the discussion shifts towards a different goal. Plotinus refutes the previous opin-ions on logical base – he shows them to be inconsistent because they violate the
12 Enn.  III.7.  7.  24-26:  “οἰp δἐf κἰνή) of soulJ σἐωJ ς) to another.” τἰ ἢ δἰαJ στή) of soulμα κἰνή) of soulJ σἐως) to another.”,  οἰp δἐf μἐJτρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temον,  οἰp δʹ ὅλως
pαρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temακολοὖθοὖT ν αὖQ τῇT .” For the origins of these notions see Armstrong,  Plotinus (Enn. III.7), 320and Clark, “Time in Plotinus,” 338.
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necessary priority of time before movement or change; but now he adds an onto-logical element to the inquiry. For this reason, I deal with the refutation of Aris-totle in a different sub-section, chapter 1.2. I will begin this section with a briefdiscussion of Aristotle’s own argument, so that the context in which the proposedarguments operate may be clear. We will see that Aristotle goes to great lengths toensure that his conception stays true to the continuity – the unity – of time. Hedoes so by ontologically linking time with space, so that time will be the measur-able aspect of a movement over a certain distance of space. Plotinus, too, is eagerto preserve the unity of time in his theory, yet he deems that Aristotle’s positionfails to do so because Aristotle fragments time into distinct moments, despite hisbest efforts to forge a concept of continuous time. But Plotinus does not simply refute the arguments of his predecessors out ofa desire to set his own theory apart. I propose that his refutations contain implicitarguments  that  support  his  own view.  Most important,  as  I  will  argue,  is  thatPlotinus implicitly sets up a distinction between temporal succession and time it-self. This distinction is necessary precisely for reasons that he shows throughoutthe refutations. None of his predecessors’ opinions make this separation, and forthis reason they all fail, in Plotinus’ mind. For him, only by distinguishing betweentemporality and time can we maintain a consistent theory that ensures the unityof time.
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In chapter 2, I will discuss Plotinus’ own approach to a theory of time. Sincehe closely interweaves the subjects  of  time and Soul,  I  will  briefly  discuss thenature of Soul and its emanation from Intellect and the One, as it is mainly dis-cussed in  Ennead  V.1.  It  is  important to remember that  for  Plotinus,  the term“soul” is not laden with as much historical meaning as it is for us nowadays. Espe-cially important is that the many layers of soul, which I will discuss in detail inchapter 2.1, are for the most part not at all concerned with subjectivity – but thismay be our first association. Rather, Soul is an ontological, cosmological, and cos-mogonical principle in the Neoplatonic context; I will mostly focus on its dispers-ive activity by which it realizes the multitude of the things, in opposition to theunifying activity of Intellect. In this, I will find the bridge back into the discussionof time – because time, as I will argue, is, for Plotinus, nothing else than this dis-persive activity of Soul which he calls the “life of Soul.”In sum, this thesis argues that Plotinus, against his predecessors, provides aconcept of time as not something appearing together with moving phenomena,but rather,  as the principle of  dispersion which makes phenomenal  movementpossible in the first place. In this way, Plotinus succeeds, first, in following the lo-gical order of the priority of time and posteriority of movement, and, second, inhonouring the ontological unity of time. 
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CHAPTER 2 REFUTED OPINIONS
This chapter will be concerned with Plotinus’ refutation of his predecessors.It will follow the arguments that Plotinus launches against the opinions of earlierphilosophers and thereby negatively establish the need for a different approach –Plotinus’ own theory, which we will encounter in chapter 2. But I will not onlyprovide an explanation of Plotinus’ arguments. I will also argue that these refuta-tions are not merely a formality for Plotinus; on the contrary, hidden within themthere are the two positive attributes of what Plotinus deems necessary for an ad-equate theory of time. First, the approach must honour the logical priority of tem-porality over change. Only if we presuppose temporality is change possible. Sec-tion 1.1 of this chapter will deal with this logical side of Plotinus’ argumentation. Iwill argue that Plotinus achieves his goal of preserving the logical hierarchy bydistinguishing between time and what I will call temporality; for Plotinus, the lat-ter is an attribute of phenomenal reality, whereas he will construe the former asthe  principle  of change – or, more generally speaking, phenomenal movement –and a principle of phenomenal reality as a whole.Section 1.2 of this chapter focuses exclusively on Plotinus’ criticism of Aris-totle’s theory of time. It is still based on the arguments established in section 1.1,yet, another pillar of the Plotinian theory shifts into the scope here: the unity oftime – in other words, the theory gains an ontological aspect. I do not think that itis a coincidence that Plotinus looks towards Aristotle here, since the Stagirite goes
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to great lengths to theoretically undergird the unity of time. He will do so by con-ceptualizing temporal movement as dependent of spatial extension. Since, in Aris-totle’s opinion, space is obviously continuous, time will be, too, if time is related tospace. I will give a detailed account of Aristotle’s theory in section 1.2.1 of thischapter. Plotinus will argue against this view, and he will use it to further corrob-orate his own approach. For him, Aristotle fails to ensure the unity of time be-cause he does not honour the necessary distinction between the temporal aspectof phenomenality and time as the principle of this temporality. Section 1.2.2 willfocus on Plotinus’ refutation of the Aristotelean view.
2.1 THE ARGUMENTS FROM CONSISTENCY: THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 
TIME AND SUCCESSION
In this section, I will first deal with the rejection of the notions that identifytime with movement itself or with the sphere which is moved. Plotinus’ treatise isconstructed somewhat in parallel to his earlier reflections on eternity, where herefutes the identification of eternity with either rest or the substance which is atrest. Second, I will look at Plotinus’ critique of Zeno’s theory that time is the dis-tance or interval covered by motion. 
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2.1.1 TIME IS NOT MOVEMENT
The identification of time with motion itself is dismissed in a rather shortmanner.13 
It is not possible for it [time] to be movement, whether one takes allmovements  together and makes a single  movement out of  them,  orwhether one takes it  as ordered movement,  for what we call  move-ment, of either kind, is in time.14
Motion, whether all motion or a particular motion, is  in  time, and can thereforenot be identified with time. The term “motion” (κἰJνή) of soulσἰς) to another.”) in Plotinus is rather com-plicated, for he uses it in two different senses: first, as the movement of a body(σωT μα) or of the kosmos (κἰJνή) of soulσἰν τοὖT  παντοf ς) to another.”). This movement happens only on
13 The argument is, in fact, so short that Clark feels inclined to suspect it, although being “formallylogical,” to be “a merely verbal argument.” Clark, “Time in Plotinus,” 338. I am not sure if I grasp themeaning of Clark’s critique. I take it to say something like this: the argument that time cannot bethe same as motion because motion is in time is logically sound. It depends on the exact semanticsof “in time” though.  Clark compares Plotinus with Aristotle,  stating that “in the  Physics  IV 12,221a4, Aristotle says that to be in time means to be measured by time. He had previously said thatnot only is motion measured by time but, conversely, time is measured by motion, because theydefine each other (220b15).” But that the meaning of “in time” cannot be the same in both Plotinusand Aristotle does not seem surprising. For Aristotle, time is a measure of motion. Of course, themeasure is dependent on what is being measured, otherwise it would have to measure withoutmeasuring anything. But for Plotinus, as we will see, time is the name of the activity of the Soulthat gives birth to motion, and subdues everything moving to it. Enn. III.7. 11. 25-35. This activityof the Soul he calls a kind of motion (κἰJνή) of soulσἰς) to another.”), as well. But we have to be careful here: obviously,Plotinus uses κἰJνή) of soulσἰς) to another.” in two different ways; the movement of the kosmos, which is characterizedby temporality and spatiality; and the activity of Soul, which he will indeed call “time”, but which isneither temporal nor spatial, because it is the cause of both temporality and spatiality. This move-ment, Plotinus says, is the life (ζοJ ή) of soul) of the Soul. So, Plotinus’ argument against the identification oftime with the motion of the kosmos is certainly not “merely verbal.” It is consistent with his ownapproach which makes time, as the moving life of Soul, the cosmological principle of the move-ment of the kosmos, which makes time primal to this movement.14 Enn.  III.7. 8. 1-5: “ΚἰJνή) of soulσἰν μἐfν οὖQ χ οἰvοJ ν τἐ οὖe τἐ ταf ς) to another.” σὖμπαJ σας) to another.” λαμβíος) to another.”αJ νοντἰ κἰνή) of soulJ σἐἰς) to another.” καἰf  οἰvονμἰJαν ἐQκ πασωT ν ποἰοὖT ντἰ, οὖe τἐ τή) of soulf ν τἐταγμἐJνή) of soulν. ἐQν χρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοJ νωw  γαf ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, tem ή) of soulp  κἰJνή) of soulσἰς) to another.” ἐpκατἐJρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temα ή) of soulp  λἐγομἐJνή) of soul.”
13
the lowest ontological level, the sphere of sensible phenomena. Movement, in thissense, is subjected to temporality and spatiality and is powerless to create any-thing below itself.  Second, there is movement as a cosmological principle.  Thismovement is hypostatic activity, in Soul, in Intellect, and even in the One, and it iscrucial to Plotinus’ theory of emanation. This kind of motion is neither temporalnor spatial, but is the self-unfolding activity of each  hypostasis (ὖp ποJ στασἰς) to another.”). Onthe level of Soul, Plotinus makes the crucial distinction in Ennead III.7. 11. 25-35: 
Soul, making the world of sense in imitation of that other world, mov-ing with a motion which is not that which exists There, but like it, andintending to be an image of it, first of all put itself into time, which itmade instead of eternity, and then handed over that which came intobeing as a slave to time, by making the whole of it exist in time and en-compassing all its ways with time. For since the world of sense movesin Soul – there is no other place of  it  (this  universe) than Soul  – itmoves also in the time of Soul.15
The movement (κἰJνή) of soulσἰς) to another.”) of Soul is what Plotinus will actually define as time: thelife (ζοJ ή) of soul) of Soul. But this is not the kind of motion about which he is taking whenhe argues against the identification of time with motion. He is absolutely clearabout this when he states that
15 Enn. III.7. 11. 25-35: “οὖx τω δή) of soulf  καἰf αὖQ τή) of soulf  κοJ σμον ποἰοὖT σα αἰQσθή) of soulτοf ν μἰμή) of soulJ σἐἰ ἐQκἐἰJνοὖ κἰνοὖJ μἐνονκἰJνή) of soulσἰν οὖQ  τή) of soulf ν ἐQκἐἰT,  οp μοἰJαν δἐf  τῇT  ἐQκἐἰT  καἰf  ἐfθἐJλοὖσαν ἐἰQκοJ να ἐQκἐἰJνή) of soulς) to another.” ἐἰ[ναἰ, πρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temωT τον μἐfν ἐpαὖτή) of soulf νἐQχρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοJ νωσἐν  αQ ντἰf  τοὖT  αἰQωT νος) to another.”  τοὖT τον  ποἰή) of soulJ σασα.  ἐeπἐἰτα  δἐf  καἰf  τωTw  γἐνομἐJνωw  ἐeδωκἐ  δοὖλἐὖJ ἐἰνχρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοJ νωw ,  ἐQν  χρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοJ νωw  αὖQ τοf ν  παJ ντα  ποἰή) of soulJ σασα  ἐἰ[ναἰ,  ταf ς) to another.”  τοὖJ τοὖ  δἰἐξοJ δοὖς) to another.”  αp παJ σας) to another.”  ἐQν  αὖQ τωTwπἐρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temἰλαβíος) to another.”οὖT σα. ἐQν ἐQκἐἰJνῇ γαf ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, tem κἰνοὖJ μἐνος) to another.” - οὖQ  γαJ ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, tem τἰς) to another.” αὖQ τοὖT  τοὖT δἐ τοὖT  παντοf ς) to another.” τοJ πος) to another.” ή) of soulh  ψὖχή) of soulJ  - καἰfἐQν τωTw  ἐQκἐἰJνή) of soulς) to another.” αὖ[  ἐQκἰνἐἰTτο χρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοJ νωw .” Plotinus also draws a similar contrast between psychic motionand bodily motion in Enn. III.7. 13. 30-45 and 50-65.
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as Soul presents one activity after another, and then again another inordered succession, it produces the succession along with activity.16
The movement of Soul is here described as an activity (ἐQνἐJρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temγἐἰα) that has creativepower.  The movement  of  the  kosmos,  on the  other  hand,  is  merely succession(ἐQφἐξή) of soulT ς) to another.”). This succession cannot be identified with time, since it is produced bytime and moving in time.17 This distinction between motion  in  time and atemporal motion is vital  tounderstanding Plotinus’ system. In more modern terms, I will call this the distinc-tion between time and temporality. Temporality, i.e. the succession that character-izes the sensible phenomena, is  merely the lowest end of the ontological hier-archy, in which the unity of the Highest Reality is dispersed into a manifold. Time,i.e. the cosmological principle of this dispersion in Soul, is itself atemporal; other-wise we would be forced to say that time is in time, which does not make anysense. Rather, all temporal phenomena are in time in the sense that they springfrom the time-activity of Soul. In this light, Plotinus’ next argument will be understandable. He says thatmovement can stop, but time cannot. To the obvious reply that the motion of the
kosmos never stops, Plotinus answers that 
16 Enn. III.7. 11. 35-40: “Τή) of soulf ν γαf ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, tem ἐQνἐJρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temγἐἰαν αὖQ τή) of soulT ς) to another.” παρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temἐχομἐJνή) of soul αe λλή) of soulν μἐτʹ αe λλή) of soulν, ἐἰ[θʹ ἐpτἐJρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temαν παJ λἰνἐQφἐξή) of soulT ς) to another.”, ἐQγἐJννα τἐ μἐταf  τή) of soulT ς) to another.” ἐQνἐρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temγἐἰJας) to another.” τοf  ἐQφἐξή) of soulT ς) to another.”.”17 As we see, Plotinus stays consistent throughout all of the treatise. One might, however, accusehim of not giving the theories he opposes a fair chance, since he always assumes his own view, anddisproves the others based on it.
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it would go round to the same point not in the time in which half itscourse was finished,  and one would be half,  the other double time;each movement would be movement of the universe, one going fromthe same place to the same place again,  and the other reaching thehalf-way point.18
The revolution of the sphere returns to the starting point in any given time, butdoes not return to that point in half the time, although both the half motion andthe complete motion are the movement of the kosmos. For this reason, movementcannot be identified with time. Movement, in this case, means the movement ofthe sensible which we see all around us. As soon as we open our eyes we seemovement, and it never stops. This movement is characterized by a temporal suc-cession – we experience reality as a flow of different things coming and going, oneafter another. But, if we follow Plotinus, this succession is not time itself because itpresupposes time. This is what Plotinus means here, when he says that motionhappens in time. What time itself is, he does not reveal yet; he will define it lateras the principle of the succession that characterizes the movement of the kosmos.Time will be the cosmological (and cosmogonical) activity that creates the distinctmoments, which then follow each other in succession.With the distinction between time and temporality in mind, we can meetClark’s critique that this “seems to be little more than a confusion between the
18 Enn. III.7. 8. 10-15: “καἰf αὖx τή) of soul πἐρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temφἐJρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοἰτο αh  ἐἰQς) to another.” τοf  αὖQ τοJ , οὖQ κ ἐQν ωvw  τοf  ή) of soulx μἰσὖ ή) of soule νὖσταἰ, καἰf οp  μἐfναh ν ἐeἰή) of soul ή) of soulx μἰσὖς) to another.”, οp  δἐf  δἰπλαJ σἰος) to another.”, κἰή) of soulJ σἐως) to another.” τοὖT  παντοf ς) to another.” οὖe σή) of soulς) to another.” ἐpκατἐJρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temας) to another.”, τή) of soulT ς) to another.” τἐ ἐἰQς) to another.” τοf  αὖτοf  αQ ποf  τοὖTαὖQ τοὖT  καἰf τή) of soulT ς) to another.” ἐἰQς) to another.” τοf  ή) of soulx μἰσὖ ή) of soulp κοὖJ σή) of soulς) to another.”.”
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continuous revolving of the sphere as time itself and a single revolution as a unitof time.”19 The continuous revolution of the sphere is nothing other than the con-tinuous succession of moments that is the revolving kosmos, i.e. it is temporality. Acertain length of the succession is the revolving of the kosmos, as well. But sincesuccession is only a feature of sensible phenomena, it is not a problem that we canthink of it as manifest in succession in general or as a certain part of it, just as Ican think of space as space in general or just the space filling the room in which Iam sitting. Time, however, is the principle of the succession of the phenomenalrealm, and therefore cannot be identified with the succession in general, nor witha certain length of it, and most certainly, as Plotinus wants to point out in his argu-ment, not with both. Otherwise, we would again face the problem that we wouldhave to say that time is in time, or rather, this time, that is, a certain length of time,is in time. We cannot say that because time must be the principle which gives rise
to succession; it does not have any parts. Of a certain length of succession, how-ever, we can very well say that it is part of succession in general because they areboth sensible phenomena. They are part of the same ontological tier.20 
19 Clark, “Time in Plotinus,” 339.20 Clark proposes a similar solution to the problem: “Aristotle and Plotinus reject the identifica-tion of time with motion because they do not believe it does justice to the unity of time” Ibid., 340.The unity of time as a principle is indeed Plotinus’ incentive. Nevertheless, I think that Clark failsto make clear the vital point of the distinction between succession as phenomenal and time asprincipal. Clark does refer to it though, saying that “time has its existence in the activity of soul –how could it be otherwise? But souls are not themselves in time; only their affections and produc-tions are; time is posterior to souls; for what is in time is inferior to time” It must be noted thatPlotinus indeed thinks of the souls as in time, when he speaks of the Soul temporalizing itself. Ibid;
Enn. III.7. 11. 25-35. Only the hypostatic Soul is atemporal, since time is its movement-activity. In-
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The distinction between time and the temporality of successive moments,which I have established in this section, is the first point of anchor for this thesis.It serves as one of two argumentative pillars of Plotinus’ idealist conception oftime. The second pillar will be the argument from the necessary unity of time,which I will elaborate through the scope of Plotinus’ critique of the Aristoteleantheory of time. But first, Plotinus argues against two other views on the nature oftime. He follows the refutation of time as  movement with an argument againsttime as that which is moved and time as the interval of motion.
2.1.2 TIME IS NOT THE MOVED
If time is not to be identified with movement, much less can it be identifiedwith that which is moved. For, if movement itself is only in time, in the sense of be-ing caused by Time21 as the cosmological principle of the movement-succession ofthe  kosmos, then that which is subordinate to this succession can be time evenless:
If then, time is not the movement of the sphere, it can hardly be thesphere itself, which was supposed to be time because it is in motion.22
dividual souls however are temporal manifestations of Soul and therefore in time.21 To clarify the argument, I will from now on use “Time” with a capital T to refer to Time as thecosmological principle. To refer to the more common sense of time or to temporal succession I willstick to the lower case, “time.”22 Enn. III.7. 8. 20-25: “ΕἰQ τοἰJνὖν μή) of soulδἐf  ή) of soulp  κἰJνή) of soulσἰς) to another.” τή) of soulT ς) to another.” σφαἰJρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temας) to another.” οp  χρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοJ νος) to another.”, σχολῇT  γʹ αh ν ή) of soulp  σφαἰTρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temα αὖQ τή) of soulJ ,ή) of soulz  ἐQκ τοὖT  κἰνἐἰTσθαἰ ὖp πἐνοή) of soulJ θή) of soul χρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοJ νος) to another.” ἐἰ[ναἰ.”
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This argument barely consists in one sentence,  but it  contains a valuablepoint: Plotinus refutes the view that time is to be identified with succession. Fromthis, he follows that time also cannot be identified with that which is  character-
ized by  succession. This seems like an intuitive point – to the extent that it mayseem almost redundant. Plotinus may have felt the same way, which would ex-plain  why he  spares  but  a  sentence  on  it.  Nevertheless,  there  is  an  aspect  ofPlotinus’ argument that is worth emphasizing: time is not moving! This is an im-portant point to keep in mind here. Too often we commonly identify time as some-thing that moves; we only need to think about the popular proverb “time flies.”Plotinus reminds us that time is actually  not flying; the successive moments  intime are coming and going, but Time itself stays quite the same.
2.1.3 TIME IS NOT THE INTERVAL OF MOTION
Next, Plotinus turns to the Stoic theory of time. For Zeno, time is the interval(δἰαJ στή) of soulμα) of motion, a measure of swiftness and slowness.23 If we were to takeup this view, we would encounter a serious problem: there is not only one inter-val. Even in the Stoic definition itself we already see this issue: a swift movementwill cover a greater distance than a slow one in the same time. As Clark points out,“a unit that measures, but is different from, all intervals would have a better claim
23 Clark, “Time in Plotinus,” 340-341.
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to be called time.”24 But the theory explicitly identifies time with the interval itself.And since there are many such intervals, Plotinus argues that
if it is the distance covered by the movement, first, this is not the samefor  all  movement,  not  even  uniform  movement,  for  movement  isquicker and slower, even movement in space. And both these distancescovered [by the quicker and slower movement] would be measured bysome one other thing, which would more correctly be called time. Wellthen,  of  which of  the  two  of  them is  the  distance  covered time,  orrather of which of all the movements, which are infinite in number?25
Another approach would be not to identify time with the distance coverednot by all kinds of motion, but just the movement of the universe. This view washeld by the Stoics Archytas and Chrysippus, and it avoids the impossible conclu-sion that there are many times, because the revolution of the  kosmos is uniformand one. Nevertheless, this conception must face a similar objection: either time isa measure of the distance covered by the movement of the kosmos (but that is notthe Stoic view) or time is the distance itself (which is what the Stoics are propos-ing). But what exactly do they mean by “distance covered?” It could be the intervalof the cosmic motion itself. But that is nothing other than this motion, and nothingfurther:
24 Ibid. 341.25 Enn.  III.7.  8.  20-30:  “ΕἰQ  μἐfν  δἰαJ στή) of soulμα,  πρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temωT τον  μἐfν  οὖQ  παJ σή) of soulς) to another.”  κἰνή) of soulJ σἐως) to another.”  τοf  αὖQ τοJ ,  οὖQ δἐf  τή) of soulT ς) to another.”οp μοἐἰδοὖT ς) to another.”. θαT ττον γαf ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, tem καἰf βíος) to another.”ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temαδὖJ τἐρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temον ή) of soulp  κἰJνή) of soulJ σἰς) to another.” καἰf ή) of soulp  ἐQν τοJ τωw . Καἰf ἐἰ[ἐν αe ν αe μφω μἐτρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοὖJ μἐναἰ αἰpδἰασταJ σἐἰς) to another.” ἐpνἰf ἐpτἐJρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temωw , οz  δή) of soulf  οQ ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temθοJ τἐρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temον αe ν τἰς) to another.” ἐἰeποἰ χρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοJ νον. ΠοτἐJρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temας) to another.” δή) of soulf  αὖQ τωT ν τοf  δἰαJ στή) of soulμα χρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοJ νος) to another.”,μαT λλον δἐf τἰJνος) to another.” αὖQ τωT ν αQ πἐἰJρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temον οὖQ σωT ν;”
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But if  it [time] is the distance covered by the movement of the uni-verse, if the distance in the movement itself is meant, what would thisbe other than the movement?26
And that time can be identified with the movement of the  kosmos has alreadybeen refuted above. Or “distance covered” could refer to a definite quantity; butthen we are talking about space, like the movement of a ball that rolls over thefloor. The distance that the ball covers is definitely measured in space, not in time.Lastly, the revolution of the  kosmos could have an interval because it always re-peats itself; it always comes back to the point of its origin, and then starts anew.But then there are again multiple intervals, and therefore multiple times. Thus,Plotinus says:
The movement, certainly is quantitatively determined; but this definitequantity will either be measured by space, because the space it has tra-versed  is  a  certain  amount  of  space,  and  this  will  be  the  distancecovered; but this is not time but space; or the movement itself by itscontinuity and the fact that it does not stop at once but keeps on forever,  will  contain  the  distance.  But  this  would  be  a  multiplicity  ofmovement; […]27
In this case, the quantity of the movement is merely a number, like two or three.But the distance covered by, for example, two revolutions is an interval of space.
26 Enn. III.7. 8. 30-35: “ΕἰQ δἐf  τή) of soulT ς) to another.” τοὖT  παντοf ς) to another.” δἰαJ στή) of soulμα, ἐἰQ μἐfν τοf  ἐQν αὖQ τῇT  τῇT  κἰνή) of soulJ ἐἰ δἰαJ στή) of soulμα, τἰJ αh ναe λλο ή) of soulh  ή) of soulp  κἰJνή) of soulσἰς) to another.” αh ν ἐἰeν;” See Clark, “Time in Plotinus,” 341.27 Enn. III.7. 8. 30-40: “τοf  δἐf  τοσοJ νδἐ τοὖT το ή) of soule τοἰ τωTw  τοJ πωw , οx τἰ τοσοJ δἐ οz ν δἰἐζή) of soulT λθἐ, μἐτρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temή) of soulθή) of soulJ σἐταἰ,καἰf τοf  δἰαJ στή) of soulμα τοὖT το ἐeσταἰ. τοὖT το δἐf  οὖQ  χρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοJ νος) to another.”, αQ λλαf  τοJ πος) to another.”. ή) of soulh  αὖQ τή) of soulf  ή) of soulp  κἰJνή) of soulσἰς) to another.” τῇT  σὖνἐχἐἰJαw  αὖQ τή) of soulT ς) to another.”καἰf  τωTw  μή) of soulf  ἐὖQ θὖf ς) to another.” πἐπαὖT σθαἰ, αQ λλʹ ἐQπἰλαμβíος) to another.”αJ νἐἰν αQ ἐἰJ,  τοf  δἰαJ στή) of soulμα ἐxχἐἰ. Ἀλλαf  τοὖT το τοf  πολὖf  τή) of soulT ς) to another.”κἰνή) of soulJ σἐως) to another.” αh ν ἐἰeν.”
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So, what the Stoics discover is either an interval of space or a quantity of motionas a number, and this quantity can only occur in time. We can thus summarize Plotinus’ refutation of the Stoic view by stating thatto define time as the interval or distance covered by motion is either ultimately toidentify time with motion itself – which has already been refuted – or to conflatetime with space. The Stoic view, therefore, proves to be untenable. The treatment of the view that identifies time as an interval concludes thissection of the thesis – and, I propose, a section of Plotinus’ treatise on time, aswell. We have now established the distinction between time and temporality, anddiscussed the arguments that undergird it.  Plotinus utilizes some of his prede-cessors’ theories to show that, if time (as a principle of movement) and temporal -ity or succession (as an attribute of moving phenomena) are not held apart, one’stheory of time falls prey to inconsistencies. Plotinus agrees with his opponentsthat time must have something to do with movement. Indeed, this point seems in-tuitive. Movement and succession are our first indicator that there is somethingthat we may call time. “Our ageing, the sun rising and setting, and rising again andsetting again, the phases of the moon: these phenomena make manifest a first,and probably insuperable, notion of time,” as JoseM  Baracat puts it.28 But Baracat
28 JoseM  Baracat, “Soul’s, Desire, and the Origin of Time”, Literary, Philosophical, and Religious Stud-
ies in the Platonic Tradition,  ed. John F.  Finamore and John Phillips (Sankt Augustin: Academia,2013), 28.
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also asserts that succession alone “would manifest nothing more than the unintel-ligible and inarticulate occurrence of phenomena” if  there were not somethingprior to it.29 Plotinus succeeds in showing that succession and time must be dis-tinct by critiquing views that do not uphold this difference: the view that time isthe same as  succession; the view that time is  in  succession; and the view thattime is the velocity with which the succession proceeds. The first view is rejectedbecause to think succession we must presuppose time. That the second view isuntenable follows from that argument, as well;  if succession presupposes time,that which is in succession presupposes time all the more. Lastly, the third view isshown to be reducible to the already refuted first view or to be a conflation of theconcepts of time and space. Plotinus’ own view will solve – arguably, of course – these problems by con-ceptualizing time as the principle of movement that transcends the temporality of
immanent  phenomena. But before he proceeds to work out his own account, hefirst turns to another famous definition of time: time as the measure of move-ment. This view is famously put forth by Aristotle, and Plotinus’ refutation of itwill  serve  as  the  second  pillar  of  this  thesis.  Until  now,  I  have  argued  (withPlotinus) that time is necessarily a transcendent principle because phenomenalsuccession presupposes the concept of time. Hence, the argument was mainly lo-
29 Ibid.  33.  See also Peter Manchester,  “Time and the Soul in Plotinus,  Enn. III 7 [45],  11.”  Di-
onysius 2 (1978): 28.
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gical. But now, Plotinus argues from the structure of time itself. He will show thattime must be thought of as transcendent if we suppose it to be unified. Hence, thefollowing arguments will be mainly  ontological.  By arguing that Aristotle’s con-ception fails to ensure the unity of time – although Aristotle goes to great lengthsto do exactly this – Plotinus also implicitly disproves another intuition about thenature of time: that it consists of distinct moments. As I will show, Aristotle triesto conceptualize time as the countable aspect of the successive moments of theflow of phenomena – in other words, for Aristotle, time is that which makes move-ment measurable. He goes on to assert that the phenomenal reality is continuousbecause the counted moments are infinitely divisible. Plotinus will argue that thisis not enough to unify the phenomenal reality (nor to unify the nature of time).For him, the unity of our reality can only be conceptually ensured if we under -stand time to be the transcendent principle of movement (not a measure of it).
2.2 THE ARGUMENT FROM ONTOLOGY: THE UNITY OF TIME
In the ninth section of  Ennead  III.7 Plotinus directs his critique towards arather intuitive notion of time. We might look at our wrist – if we wear a watch –and find that time may function as a measure. Plotinus particularly focuses on theposition that time is “a number of change in respect of before and after,” which isfamously put forth by Aristotle in his Physics.30 I shall dwell for a moment on this
30 Phys. 219b1: “τοὖT το γαJ ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, tem ἐQστἰν οp  χρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοJ νος) to another.”, αQ ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temἰθμοf ς) to another.” κἰνή) of soulJ σἐως) to another.” καταf  τοf  πρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοJ τἐρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temον καἰf ὖx στἐρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temον.”
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definition; first, it will be crucial to have a grasp on what Aristotle proposes to un-derstand Plotinus’ criticism. Second, I shall argue that Plotinus focuses on only asmall portion of the Stagirite’s argument in order to make an important point forhis own theory. Both of these aims require a closer look at Aristotle’s concepts.
2.2.1 ARISTOTLE’S THEORY OF TIME
Aristotle’s definition presents us with three key elements: first, time is re-lated to change, second, it refers to something ‘before and after’, and third, it doesso  by  being  a  number.  I  shall  therefore  analyze  the  argument  following  thisthreefold structure. First, we need to clarify in what way time is related to change.For Aristotle, there can be no time without change or alteration.31 He uses boththe terms μἐταβíος) to another.”ολή) of soulJ  and κἰJνή) of soulσἰς) to another.”, which usually refer to different types of change,and also  motion through space.  Aristotle  clarifies  what  he  means in  a remarkupon his theory:
It might also be wondered what kind of change time is a number of.Could it be the number of any kind of change? And in fact things cometo be and cease to be in time, increase in time, alter in time, and movein time. So in so far as there is such a thing as change, time is a numberof any and every change. And so, speaking generally, it is a number ofcontinuous  change,  rather  than  a  number  of  a  particular  kind  ofchange.32
31 Phys. 218b21: “Ἀλλαf  μή) of soulf ν οὖQ δ' αe νἐὖ γἐ μἐταβíος) to another.”ολή) of soulT ς) to another.”.” See also 218b35-219a2.32 Phys.  IV.14.  223a29-b1:  “αQ πορóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temή) of soulJ σἐἰἐ  δ'  αe ν  τἰς) to another.”  καἰf  ποἰJας) to another.”  κἰνή) of soulJ σἐως) to another.”  οp  χρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοJ νος) to another.”  αQ ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temἰθμοJ ς) to another.”.  ή) of soulhοp ποἰασοὖT ν; καἰf γαf ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, tem γἰJγνἐταἰ ἐQν χρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοJ νωw  καἰf φθἐἰJρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temἐταἰ καἰf αὖQ ξαJ νἐταἰ καἰf αQ λλοἰοὖT ταἰ καἰf φἐJρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temἐταἰ. ῇv
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So it is change in general – substantial, qualitative, and locomotive – and not anyparticular  kind of  change that  is  connected to  time.  The reason why Aristotlethinks that time requires change seems rather intuitive: if nothing ever changedwe would have no notion of the passage of time, or duration, or any concept oftemporality at all. Nevertheless, time and change are not identical; in support ofthis claim he proposes two arguments before he even begins his treatise: changeis always found in particulars, whereas time is universal. He writes, 
the change of anything exists only in the thing that is being changed, orwhere that changing thing happens to be; time, however, is both every-where and present alike to all things.33
Moreover, change happens more slowly or more quickly; yet, speed or velocity  isrelated to temporality but does not pertain to time itself. For what changes in ashorter span of time is called fast, while that which changes in a longer span oftime  is  called  slow.34 Time  is  not  change  then,  but  nevertheless  never  found
οὖ[ ν  κἰJνή) of soulσἰJς) to another.”  ἐQστἰ,  ταὖJ τῇ  ἐQστἰfν  ἐpκαJ στή) of soulς) to another.”  κἰνή) of soulJ σἐως) to another.” αQ ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temἰθμοJ ς) to another.”.  δἰοf  κἰνή) of soulJ σἐωJ ς) to another.”  ἐQστἰν  αp πλωT ς) to another.”  αQ ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temἰθμοf ς) to another.”σὖνἐχοὖT ς) to another.”, αQ λλ' οὖQ  τἰνοJ ς) to another.”.” Richard Sorabji,  Time, Creation and the Continuum: theories of antiquity
and the early middle ages, (London: Duckworth, 1983), 85. Aristotle usually distinguishes betweenthree different kinds of change: substantial change (μἐταβíος) to another.”ολή) of soulJ ν) (i.e.  creation and destruction),qualitative change, and locomotion (both κἰJνή) of soulσἰς) to another.”). He makes it clear here that he means κἰJνή) of soulσἰς) to another.” aswell as μἐταβíος) to another.”ολή) of soulJ  in the context of the discussion of time. See also Phys. IV.10. 218B19-20: “μή) of soulδἐfνδἐf  δἰαφἐρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temἐJτω λἐJγἐἰν ή) of soulp μἰTν ἐQν τωTw  παρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοJ ντἰ κἰJνή) of soulσἰν ή) of soulh  μἐταβíος) to another.”ολή) of soulJ ν.” Sorabji,  Time, Creation and the
Continuum, 74.33 Phys.  IV.10. 218b10-13: “ή) of soulp  μἐfν οὖ[ ν ἐpκαJ στοὖ μἐταβíος) to another.”ολή) of soulf  καἰf  κἰJνή) of soulσἰς) to another.” ἐQν αὖQ τωTw  τωTw  μἐταβíος) to another.”αJ λλοντἰμοJ νον  ἐQστἰJν,  ή) of soulh  οὖv  αh ν  τὖJ χῇ  οh ν  αὖQ τοf  τοf  κἰνοὖJ μἐνον  καἰf  μἐταβíος) to another.”αJ λλον.  οp  δἐf  χρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοJ νος) to another.”  οp μοἰJως) to another.”  καἰfπανταχοὖT  καἰf παρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temαf  παT σἰν.”34 Phys. IV.10. 218b13-20: “ἐeτἰ δἐf  μἐταβíος) to another.”ολή) of soulf  μἐJν ἐQστἰ θαJ ττων καἰf βíος) to another.”ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temαδὖτἐJρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temα, χρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοJ νος) to another.” δ' οὖQ κ ἐeστἰν.τοf  γαf ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, tem βíος) to another.”ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temαδὖf  καἰf  ταχὖf  χρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοJ νωw  ωx ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temἰσταἰ, ταχὖf  μἐfν τοf  ἐQν οQ λἰJγωw  πολὖf  κἰνοὖJ μἐνον, βíος) to another.”ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temαδὖf  δἐf  τοf  ἐQνπολλωTw  οQ λἰJγον.”
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without change. From this argument, Aristotle concludes that time must be a cer-tain “aspect of change.”35 Change,  in  turn,  relies  upon  what  Aristotle  calls  a  certain  “magnitude”(mἐJγἐθος) to another.”)36 This step needs some further explanation. Why does Aristotle intro-duce another element into the discussion and propose that “change follows mag-nitude, and time follows change?”37 The key to answering that question seems tolie in the understanding of the term ‘following.’ Ursula Coope explains that in thiscase “the claim that X follows Y implies that certain important features of X arethe way they are because of corresponding features of Y.”38 And the feature of timethat Aristotle wants to ground in magnitude is continuity. Our experience of tem-poral succession is continuous; there are no breaks or gaps in the flow of change.Since, for Aristotle, time is an aspect of change, he concludes that time inherits itscontinuity from change. This claim seems to be at least problematic. The relianceof temporal continuity on the continuity of change is not an evident concept; nev-ertheless, Aristotle provides no argument to support it.39 Moreover, he maneuvers
35 Phys. IV.11. 219a9: “τή) of soulT ς) to another.” κἰνή) of soulJ σἐωJ ς) to another.” τἰJ  ἐQστἰν οp  χρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοJ νος) to another.”.” We could object here that this argumentdoes not necessarily follow. Just because time and change always occur together, it does not meanthat time is an aspect of change. We could just as well assume that change is an aspect of time, orthat  they  are  interdependent.  As  I  already  argued,  Plotinus  thinks  that  temporality  is  a  phe-nomenon that always occurs with phenomena. Yet, this is because they are both caused by Time(the cosmological principle) in the way that phenomena are always temporal, i.e. moving forwardto something that has not been there before.36 Phys. IV.11. 219a11.37 Phys. IV.11. 219b15: “αQ κολοὖθἐἰT γαJ ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, tem, ωp ς) to another.” ἐQλἐJχθή) of soul, τωTw  μἐfν μἐγἐJθἐἰ ή) of soulp  κἰJνή) of soulσἰς) to another.”, ταὖJ τῇ δ' οp  χρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοJ νος) to another.”,ωx ς) to another.” φαμἐν.”38 Ursula Coope, Time for Aristotle: Physics IV. 10-14, (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2005), 48.39 Ibid., 53.
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himself  into  another  problem:  he  now  needs  to  account  for  the  continuity  ofchange in order to ground the continuity of time. This is the reason why he bringsmagnitude into the theory. For him, magnitude seems to be evidently continuous,and what is more, it is related to change in such a way that it can undergird thecontinuity of both change and time. He claims that “it  is because magnitude iscontinuous that change is too, and because change is continuous, time is too.”40 Now, what exactly does Aristotle mean by magnitude? I can imagine threedifferent ways in which this could be understood. First, Aristotle could mean acertain length of time. This would make no sense at all, since what he would besaying then is that time is continuous because time is continuous. Second, andmore plausible, he could mean a certain degree of qualitative change. Coope clari-fies this option with the example of the ocean changing colours: “when the seachanged gradually from dark blue to a lighter blue, the magnitude along with itchanged would be the spectrum of lighter and lighter shades of blue.”41 But, ac-cording to her, this possibility of this understanding must be ruled out because itcannot ground Aristotle’s understanding of continuity.  For Aristotle,  to be con-tinuous means to be “divisible into parts which are always further divisible,” i.e.continuity means infinite divisibility.42 In De Sensu, Aristotle denies that qualitat-
40 Phys. IV.11. 219a12-13: “δἰαf  γαf ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, tem τοf  τοf  μἐJγἐθος) to another.” ἐἰ[ναἰ σὖνἐχἐfς) to another.” καἰf ή) of soulp  κἰJνή) of soulσἰJς) to another.” ἐQστἰν σὖνἐχή) of soulJ ς) to another.”, δἰαfδἐf  τή) of soulf ν κἰJνή) of soulσἰν οp  χρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοJ νος) to another.”.”41 Coope, Time for Aristotle, 51.42 Phys.  VI.2. 232b24-25: “σὖνἐχἐfς) to another.” τοf  δἰαἰρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temἐτοf ν ἐἰQς) to another.” αἰQἐἰf  δἰαἰρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temἐταJ .” See Coope,  Time for Aristotle,51, 55.
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ive states are infinitely divisible.43 I suggested earlier that the relation of “follow-ing” between time and change, and change and magnitude must be interpreted asa causal relationship: A follows B means that A has certain features because B hascorresponding features. The magnitude in question must be continuous, i.e. infin-itely divisible, in order to ground the continuity of change and time. Therefore,magnitude can neither be understood temporally nor qualitatively. The only remaining option is to understand magnitude as spatial magnitude,i.e. a certain distance between two points in space from each other. In this lightAristotle’s remarks following his insistence that time relies on change which, inturn, relies on magnitude become transparent:
Now, what is before and after is found primarily in place. In that con-text it depends on position, but because it is in magnitude, it must alsobe found, in an analogous fashion, in change. And since time always fol-lows the  nature  of  change,  what  is  before  and after  applies  also  totime.44
This reading confronts us with a problem. It comes to mind quite naturallythat a certain motion should be related to the spatial magnitude – its path, so tospeak – over which it is moving. But, as we saw earlier, Aristotle does not limit thenotion of change to locomotion when it comes to the discussion of time. He expli-
43 Coope, Time for Aristotle, 51.44 Phys. IV.11. 219a14-21: “τοf  δή) of soulf  πρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοJ τἐρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temον καἰf  ὖx στἐρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temον ἐQν τοJ πωw  πρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temωT τοJ ν ἐQστἰν. ἐQνταὖT θα μἐfν δή) of soulfτῇT  θἐJσἐἰ.  ἐQπἐἰf  δ'  ἐQν  τωTw  μἐγἐJθἐἰ ἐeστἰ τοf  πρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοJ τἐρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temον καἰf  ὖx στἐρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temον, αQ ναJ γκή) of soul καἰf  ἐQν  κἰνή) of soulJ σἐἰ ἐἰ[ναἰ τοfπρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοJ τἐρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temον καἰf ὖx στἐρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temον, αQ ναJ λογον τοἰTς) to another.” ἐQκἐἰT. αQ λλαf  μή) of soulf ν καἰf ἐQν χρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοJ νωw  ἐeστἰν τοf  πρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοJ τἐρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temον καἰf ὖx στἐρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temονδἰαf  τοf  αQ κολοὖθἐἰTν αQ ἐἰf θατἐJρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temωw  θαJ τἐρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temον αὖQ τωT ν.”
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citly includes substantial and qualitative changes. So, as Coope puts the question,“in what way are qualitative changes related to spatial paths?”45 One way to thinkabout the problem would be to regard a change in place as also a kind of change inquality; we would then think about the being in a certain place of a thing as a cer-tain temporal quality of this thing. It is a certain quality of X to be at the place p1,and a different quality of X to be at p2. In between those two qualities there musthave happened a change over a certain spatial magnitude.But let us also consider an example that is not so clearly spatial. I mentionedearlier  the  qualitative  change  of  the  colour  of  the  ocean  becoming  graduallylighter. This change is not obviously following along a certain spatial magnitude. Itseems to me that Coope offers an explanation that can solve the issue and is alsogrounded  in  the  text.  She  points  to  Aristotle’s  treatment  of  the  continuity  ofchange in Phys. VI.4 and 5: 
[Aristotle] claims there that a qualitative change is infinitely divisibleonly accidentally and that its infinite divisibility is explained by the di-visibility of the changing thing.46
If we think of it that way we must indeed assume that what is infinitely divis-ible about a certain X are X’s spatial properties, since every length of space X is oc-cupying can be infinitely divided into smaller parts. The nature of a change, then,
45 Coope, Time for Aristotle, 52.46 Ibid; Phys. VI.4. 235a17-18, 235a34-36, VI.5. 236b2-8.
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looks like this: one part (in space) of a thing (which is undergoing a change) stillfeatures a certain quality, while another part of it already features another quality.The change becomes more and more prevalent as more and more parts of thechanging thing feature the new quality. Aristotle puts it the following way:
Everything that changes is necessarily divisible. For every change has astarting-point and an end-point, and when something – the thing itselfand all its parts – is at the end-point of its change, it is no longer chan-ging,  and when it  is  at  the starting-point  of  its  change,  it  is  not yetchanging, because anything which remains the same in itself and in itsparts is not changing. It necessarily follows, therefore, that part of thechanging object is at the one point and part is at the other point. Afterall, it cannot be at both points or at neither point.47
In other words, a change in quality relies on a change in form. A thing changesqualities through a continuous rearrangement of its parts,  and this happens inspace. In our example of the changing colour of the ocean, the change is continu-ous because lighter shades of blue are gradually spreading through all the infin-itely divisible parts of the ocean’s surface. The structure of the change, therefore,depends on the structure of spatial magnitude, insofar as the change is continu-ous because a certain spatial magnitude over which it happens is also continu-
47 Phys. VI.4. 234b10-18: “ἐQπἐἰf γαf ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, tem ἐeκ τἰνος) to another.” ἐἰeς) to another.” τἰ παT σα μἐταβíος) to another.”ολή) of soulJ , καἰf οx ταν μἐfν ῇ[  ἐQν τοὖJ τωw  ἐἰQς) to another.” οzμἐτἐJβíος) to another.”αλλἐν,  οὖQ κἐJτἰ  μἐταβíος) to another.”αJ λλἐἰ,  οx ταν δἐf  ἐQξ  οὖv  μἐτἐJβíος) to another.”αλλἐν,  καἰf  αὖQ τοf  καἰf  ταf  μἐJρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temή) of soul παJ ντα, οὖe πωμἐταβíος) to another.”αJ λλἐἰ, τοf  γαf ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, tem ωp σαὖJ τως) to another.” ἐeχον καἰf αὖQ τοf  καἰf ταf  μἐJρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temή) of soul οὖQ  μἐταβíος) to another.”αJ λλἐἰ, αQ ναJ γκή) of soul οὖ[ ν τοf  μἐJν τἰ ἐQντοὖJ τωw  ἐἰ[ναἰ,  τοf  δ'  ἐQν  θατἐJρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temωw  τοὖT  μἐταβíος) to another.”αJ λλοντος) to another.”·  οὖe τἐ  γαf ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, tem  ἐQν  αQ μφοτἐJρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοἰς) to another.”  οὖe τ'  ἐQν  μή) of soulδἐτἐJρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temωwδὖνατοJ ν.”
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ous.48 The instantaneous stages of change are what Aristotle calls “nows,” whichare characterized by corresponding to a “before and after” in magnitude, change,and time. This point shall prove to be crucial for Aristotle’s definition of time asnumber, since what is being numbered are precisely the nows. Aristotle foresees the problem that the terms “before” and “after” are usuallyassociated with time. Since he does not want to fall into the trap of circularitywhen grounding time in the notion of something being before and after, he makesit clear that these terms are to be taken first in a spatial sense, whereby they de-pend on the position of the changing thing.49 As we have seen, change relies onthat part of the infinitely divisible spatial extension of the changing thing in whichit is happening. We can see, therefore, why a certain stage of a change must beclosely related to the position in which it is happening. Aristotle calls these stagesof change the boundaries of a certain moment. And here is where time enters theargument: two instantaneous stages of a change are the limits of what is an in-stant of time:
However,  we know time too when we distinguish change by distin-guishing its limits as before and after; and we say that time has passedwhen we have received an impression of the before and after in a pro-cess of change. We distinguish time by taking the before and the after
48 Coope, Time for Aristotle, 52-53. 49 Phys. IV.11. 219a14-15: “τοf  δή) of soulf  πρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοJ τἐρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temον καἰf ὖx στἐρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temον ἐQν τοJ πωw  πρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temωT τοJ ν ἐQστἰν.”
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of  change  to  be  different  and  by  supposing  there  to  be  somethingwhich comes between them.50
So, a before and an after in a change denote two distinct instantaneous stages ofthis change, which enclose between them an instant of time. A certain change willtherefore have a finite number of instantaneous stages, which happen over a cer-tain magnitude of space, and which ‘entail’,  in a sense, a certain number of in-stants of time. Hence, Aristotle affirms that “we can take for granted the notion that what islimited by a now is a stretch of time.”51 This is why for Aristotle it is so importantthat time can be counted. It is made up of instants which are bounded by instant-aneous stages of a change happening in a certain magnitude in space. And here wehave Aristotle’s famous definition of time: “a number of change in respect of be-fore and after […] in the sense of that which is numbered, not in the sense of thatby which we number.”52 We can summarize Aristotle’s position in this way: we need to ensure the
theoretical continuity  of  time,  since  our  experience  of the temporal flux is  notbroken by any gaps. For Aristotle, this is only possible if we base the continuity of
50 Phys.  IV.11. 219a22-26: “αQ λλαf  μή) of soulf ν καἰf  τοf ν χρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοJ νον γἐ γνωρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temἰJζομἐν οx ταν οp ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temἰJσωμἐν τή) of soulf ν κἰJνή) of soulσἰν,τωTw  πρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοJ τἐρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temον καἰf  ὖx στἐρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temον οp ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temἰJζοντἐς) to another.”· καἰf  τοJ τἐ φαμἐfν γἐγονἐJναἰ χρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοJ νον, οx ταν τοὖT  πρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοτἐJρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοὖ καἰfὖp στἐJρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοὖ ἐQν  τῇT  κἰνή) of soulJ σἐἰ αἰeσθή) of soulσἰν λαJ βíος) to another.”ωμἐν.  οp ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temἰJζομἐν δἐf  τωTw  αe λλο καἰf  αe λλο ὖp πολαβíος) to another.”ἐἰTν  αὖQ ταJ ,  καἰfμἐταξὖJ  τἰ αὖQ τωT ν ἐxτἐρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temον.”51 Phys. IV.11. 219a28-29:”τοf  γαf ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, tem οp ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temἰζοJ μἐνον τωTw  νὖT ν χρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοJ νος) to another.” ἐἰ[ναἰ δοκἐἰT· καἰf ὖp ποκἐἰJσθω.”52 Phys. IV.11. 219a36-b8: “οx ταν δἐf  τοf  πρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοJ τἐρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temον (219b.) καἰf ὖx στἐρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temον, τοJ τἐ λἐJγομἐν χρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοJ νον. [...] οpδή) of soulf  χρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοJ νος) to another.” ἐQστἰfν τοf  αQ ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temἰθμοὖJ μἐνον καἰf οὖQ χ ωvw  αQ ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temἰθμοὖT μἐν.”
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time in the continuity of space. He seems to think that space is just obviously con-tinuous, and, therefore, he sees no need to further undergird the unity of space.Moreover, precisely because space is obviously continuous, it is able to providethe  grounds  for  this  feature  of  time  as  well.  Hence,  Aristotle  conceptualizeschange as structurally dependent on the space in which the change is happening.This does not only pertain to locomotion, but also to qualitative and substantialchanges, in the way we have seen – a gradual movement in the spatially extendedparts of the whole that undergoes change. The continuity of this movement is en-sured because these spatially extended parts are infinitely divisible – which is pre-cisely Aristotle’s definition of continuity: infinite divisibility. Now, if we look at change itself, it is, therefore, happening gradually. Thereare continuous – I have also said “instantaneous” before – stages of every particu-lar change; Aristotle calls these stages “nows.” And here is where time enters thetheory. Time is what happens in between these nows, in the way that between twonows there is a certain span of time. By counting these “periods”53 of time we can,therefore,  measure change. This is why Aristotle calls time a measure of move-ment.
53 For the lack of a better word, I call them “periods.” It is not an ideal term, though, because theseperiods are not really temporally extended, since the nows are – because of their structural de-pendence on spatiality – infinitely divisible and, therefore, instantaneous.
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2.2.2 TIME IS NOT THE MEASURE OF MOVEMENT
Whether Plotinus’ arguments against Aristotle are successful is debated inthe literature.  Richard Sorabji  calls  part  of  Plotinus’  criticisms a “bogey.”54 ForClark, Plotinus’ arguments are either “sound but […] do not meet Aristotle’s posi-tion squarely” or “meet Aristotle squarely but are not sound.”55 It is possible thatthe reason why some of Plotinus’ arguments might be seen as subpar is that hemay not really be concerned with a proper refutation of Aristotle. Rather, he useshis critique of Aristotle’s concept as a launch pad for his own approach. I will ar-gue that, in Plotinus’ mind, a concept of reality that features temporality as an in-
dependent  phenomenon is  doomed  to  fail.  To  be  clear,  by  ‘independent  phe-nomenon’ I do not mean that it is not related to other phenomena. As we haveseen,  Aristotle  clearly  proposes  that  time  is  indeed  related  to  motion,  and  tospace. Nevertheless, time has a certain nature distinct from the motion to which itbelongs. As Plotinus points out, if we think about a number measuring something,it must be “possible to think of the number, and the measure is a measure, with acertain nature, even if  it is not yet measuring, so time, too,  must have its ownnature since it is measuring.”56 For Plotinus, we shall see, temporality is not a phe-
54 Sorabji, Time, Creation, and the Continuum, 89.55 Clark, “Time in Plotinus,” 346.56 Enn.  III.7.9. 10-15: “νοἐἰTν τοf ν αQ ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temἰθμοJ ν, καἰQ  τοf  μἐJτρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temον μἐJτρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temον ἐQστἰf  φὖJ σἰν ἐeχον τἰναJ , καh ν μή) of soulJ τωμἐτρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temῇT ,  οὖx τω δἐἰT  ἐeχἐἰν καἰf  τοf ν  χρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοJ νον μἐJτρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temον οe ντα.”  Michael Wagner,  The Enigmatic Reality of
Time. Aristotle, Plotinus, and Today. Ancient Mediterranean and Medieval Texts and Contexts, ed.Robert Berchman and Jacob Neusner, Studies in Platonism, Neoplatonism, and the Platonic Tradi-tion, ed. Robert Berchman and John Finamore, vol. 7 (Boston: Brill, 2008), 329: “[The claim that
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nomenon  that  accompanies  every  occurring  motion;  temporality  will  be  the
nature of everything that appears (and moves) because it is created by the move-ment of Soul – and this movement is what Plotinus calls Time.Michael Wagner identifies three steps in which Plotinus argues against everypart of Aristotle’s approach independently – although, we might say, sometimesredundantly, since he refutes positions that Aristotle criticizes as well. This maybe another reason why scholars such as Clark have been led to the conclusion thatPlotinus’ critique is left wanting. 
(1) Time is a continuous measure which measures a motion by being a magnitude running along with movement. (Enn. III.7.9. 17-19)(2) Time is not a magnitude running along with movement, but the num-ber of that magnitude. (Enn. III.7.9. 44-45)(3) Time is the number of motion measuring according to before and after. (Enn. III.7.9. 56-57)57 
Argument (3) most closely resembles Aristotle’s position. Nevertheless, (1) and(2) can be said to run up to (3); (1) is tackling the question whether a line runningalong with movement can properly be said to measure that movement; (2) is theconclusion of (1): in order to measure the movement, the line running along with
time measures motion] proposes that time does this by being something distinct from every par-ticular motion, and so capable of measuring it.”57 Wagner, The Enigmatic Reality of Time, 328. Numbering altered.
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it must itself be numbered; and (3) expands (2) to mirror Aristotle’s argumentmore closely by adding the moments of “before and after.” Plotinus criticisms centre around two main points, to which he comes backthroughout his dealing with Aristotle’s definition. First, if time is to be continuousit cannot have a number; otherwise it will be an aggregation of numeric units,rather than a unified phenomenon. Second, Plotinus asserts that what preciselymakes the number of motion not just any, but a  temporal  measure remains un-answered. It is important to remember that, for Aristotle, a continuous magnitude, towhich (1) refers, is such by virtue of being infinitely divisible; it must not be con-stituted by minimal parts.58 Plotinus seems to refer to this concept in a short de-tour at the beginning of Ennead III.7.9, when he asks whether time could measureall movement in general or only regular movement.59 This question is rhetorical;only  regular,  i.e.  continuous,  movement  can  be  measured.  The  reasoning  hereseems to be that discontinuous movement cannot be measured by a continuousform  of  measurement,  such  as  time.  Plotinus  does  not  argue  further  for  thepremise that time must be continuous; it seems obvious, though, to assume there
58 Ibid., 329.59 The way Plotinus speaks about regular and irregular movement seems to refer to continuousand discontinuous movement. Clark comes to the same conclusion. He also points out that Aris-totle, as we said, regards all motion as continuous in his discussion of time in Phys. IV. In this casePlotinus’ point that only regular movement can be measured does not hit Aristotle. But elsewhereAristotle does maintain that some forms of movement are irregular. Clark, “Time in Plotinus,” 342-343. Phys. VI.5. 236a35-b20 and VII.4. 248a5-10.
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are no breaks in the temporal flux – as we saw, Aristotle went to great lengths toestablish the continuous nature of  time.  Plotinus,  on the other hand,  does notseem to feel the need to undergird theoretically temporal continuity. For him, thisaspect of time may be sufficiently established by his own theory, by which timewill be the continuous activity of Soul.After Plotinus presumably disposes of the minor issue that time – if it is ameasure – can only measure continuous movement, he proceeds with his main ar-gumentation. Clark proposes that this step takes place in Plotinus’ analogy of thenumber ten, which measures both ten horses and ten cows, and the measuringunit that measures both liquids and solids:
But if one uses the same measure for both kinds of movement [regularand irregular] and in general  for all  movement,  quick and slow, thenumber and measure will be like the ten which counts both horses andcows, or like the same measure of liquids and solids.60 
Clark concludes that “this analogy shows, as Aristotle admitted, that the numberten as such is no more time than it is a horse. To understand number in this sensedoes not enlighten us on the nature of time.”61 Yet this analogy does not seem toshow that time cannot measure like the number ten does. Plotinus gives the an-swer a few lines later when he asserts that time shall not be “made up of abstract
60 Enn. III.7.9. 5-10: “ΕἰQ δἐf  τωTw  αὖQ τωTw  ἐpκατἐJρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temαν καἰf οx λως) to another.” παT αν, ταχἐἰTαν, βíος) to another.”ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temαδἐἰTαν, ἐeταἰ οp  αQ ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temἰθμοJ ς) to another.”καἰf τοf  μἐJτρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temον τοἰοὖT τον, οἰvον ἐἰQ  δἐκαf ς) to another.” ἐeἰν μἐτρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοὖT σα καἰf ἰxπποὖς) to another.” καἰf βíος) to another.”οὖT ς) to another.”, ή) of soulh  ἐἰQ τοf  αὖQ τοf  μἐJτρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temον καἰfὖp γρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temωT ν καἰf ξή) of soulρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temωT ν ἐeἰν.”61 Clark, “Time in Plotinus,” 343-344. 
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units” (μοναδἰκοJ ς) to another.”).62 He believes that time must be continuous, and therefore notconstituted by digits like the number ten, which is constituted by ten times one. Clark then continues his analysis: 
If, however time is not the ten, it may be the quart, that is, it may be ameasure which has of its own apart from the wheat or motions meas-ured.  Let  there  be  an  analogy between ten  quarts  of  wine  and  tenmeasures (hours) of motion.  The definition therefore identifies timewith this measure. It is a quantity.63
The problem here is that Plotinus does not appear to have made the distinctionthat Clark is drawing. On the contrary, the text indicates that Plotinus thought thatboth the ten that measures horses and cows, and the measure of liquids and solidsare measuring in quite the same way, namely by counting distinct units. The pointis that the transition from the minor first point about irregular movement to themain line of argumentation against time as a continuous measure has actually notyet taken place. Plotinus is saying here that if time is to measure both regular andirregular movement, then it must be a digit like ten, because only thus could itmeasure both regular and irregular movement, just as the ten can measure bothhorses and cows, or quarts can measure both wheat and wine. We can certainlyquestion whether the comparison between regular and irregular movement andhorses and cows is  excruciatingly awkward.  Nevertheless,  we need to be clear
62 Enn. III.7.9. 15-20.63 Clark, “Time in Plotinus,” 343-344.
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about  the  structure  of  the  different  lines  of  argumentation  that  Plotinus  putsforth. He only begins to tackle argument (1), as it was outlined above, in line 17,not in line 5 as Clark proposes:
But if it [time] is a continuous measure [i.e. a measure that measuresonly continuous movement], then it will be a measure because it is acertain size, like a length of one cubit. It will be magnitude, then, like aline which will obviously run along with movement.64
Note, that Plotinus is using the term “magnitude” (μἐJγἐθος) to another.”) for the first time here.He is not just changing the analogy of the measuring quart, as Clark proposes,65but starting a whole new argument. This also seems to be the reason why Clarksuggests that Plotinus does not really meet Aristotle’s poition in his argumenta-tion. He says that
it is not surprising that Plotinus argues against identifying time withthe number by which we count. In this he is merely repeating Aristotle.But what is surprising is that the chapter as a whole does not get muchbeyond this denial that time is a digit, and the uncomfortable questionarises, Did Plotinus completely misunderstand Aristotle? At any rate itcan hardly be said that this chapter meets the Aristotelean positionsquarely.66
64 Enn.  III.7. 9. 15-20: “ΕἰQ  δἐf  σὖνἐχἐfς) to another.” μἐJτρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temον ἐQστἰJ,  ποσοJ ν τἰ οh ν μἐJτρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temον ἐeσταἰ, οἰvον τοf  πή) of soulχὖαἰTονμἐJγἐθος) to another.”. ΜἐJγἐθος) to another.” τοἰJνὖν ἐeσταἰ, οἰvον γρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temαμμή) of soulf  σὖνθἐJοὖσα δὖλονοJ τἰ κἰνή) of soulJ σἐἰ.” A cubit is an ancientmeasuring unit based on the forearm length from the tip of the middle finger to the bottom of theelbow.65 Clark, “Time in Plotinus,” 345: “In examining the suggestion that time is a quantity, Plotinusfirst (line 19) changes his analogy. The quantity, instead of remaining a quart, becomes a line run-ning along with the motion.” 66 Ibid., 344.
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But, as we shall see now, Plotinus does not continually argue against the positionthat time is a digit; he rather refutes time as a digit, and then moves on to showthat the Aristotelean position leads to a view that cannot escape the issue of redu-cing time to the measure by which we count, despite Aristotle’s best efforts to mit-igate this problem. It is not the goal of this thesis to prove Plotinus either right orwrong in his criticism of Aristotle. But it is important for us to understand whatPlotinus is saying, in order to understand both his own view and why he thinkshis own approach is superior to Aristotle’s. In line 17, Plotinus finally launches into his main line of argumentation. He isnow working to disprove argument (1): that time measures motion by being acertain quantity, or magnitude running along with the movement. First, he won-ders why a magnitude running along with movement should measure that move-ment just by virtue of running along with it. Moreover, if time measures motionsimply by running parallel to it, then why should time be thought of as measuringmotion and not the other way around? Second, Plotinus raises another question:suppose this line-like magnitude measures motion, still it is unclear how it doesthat. What about the magnitude makes it a measure? Moreover, what makes it atemporal measure, one that measures the temporal aspect of the movement that itmeasures? The first argument against (1) is stated in a series of questions: “But howwill this line running along measure that with which it runs? Why should one of
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them measure the other rather than the other the one?”67 The gist of this argu-ment seems clear enough; it is not clear why a line should measure somethingsolely by virtue of running along with it. Moreover, suppose it would do so, thenthe question arises, why should the line running along measure motion, and notvice versa.68 Clark argues that this argument is not valid, unless Plotinus can showwhy  such  a  reciprocal  relationship  between  time  and  motion  is  impossible.Moreover,  he points towards the passages where Aristotle admits that,  indeed,time and motion measure each other.69 Clark’s criticism here does make a validpoint. Nevertheless, if we want to define time as a measure, then it seems just asvalid to ask which of the several elements in question is measuring and which ismeasured. Wagner illustrates this point with several examples, one of which I wouldlike to take into consideration:
As  my wrist-watch ticks  away the  seconds,  do these  magnitudes  oftime called  seconds  measure the mechanical or electronic activity inthe watch responsible for the ticks of its second-hand or for the as-cending numerals of its digital seconds-readout, or do those mechan-ical  or  electronic  activities  measure  the  second-magnitudes?  […]Plotinus wonders […] which of the two should more properly be desig-
67 Enn.  III.7.  9.  19-21:  “Ἀλλʹ  αὖx τή) of soul  σὖνθἐJοὖσα  πωT ς) to another.”  μἐτρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temή) of soulJ σἐἰ  τo  ωvw  σὖνθἐἰT;  Τíος) to another.”M  γαf ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, tem  μαT λλονοp ποτἐρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temονοὖT ν θaM τἐρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temον;”68 Wagner, The Enigmatic Reality of Time, 331.69 Clark, “Time in Plotinus,” 345. See Phys. IV 12 220b14-16: “οὖQ  μοJ νον δἐf  τή) of soulf ν κἰJνή) of soulσἰν τωTw  χρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοJ νωwμἐτρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοὖT μἐν, αQ λλαf  καἰf τῇT  κἰνή) of soulJ σἐἰ τοf ν χρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοJ νον δἰαf  τοf  οp ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temἰJζἐσθαἰ ὖp π' αQ λλή) of soulJ λων· οp  μἐfν γαf ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, tem χρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοJ νος) to another.” οp ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temἰJζἐἰτή) of soulf ν κἰJνή) of soulσἰν αQ ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temἰθμοf ς) to another.” ωh ν αὖQ τή) of soulT ς) to another.”, ή) of soulp  δἐf  κἰJνή) of soulσἰς) to another.” τοf ν χρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοJ νον.”
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nated to be  time? Is  it  more properly the purported temporal  mag-nitude thought to proceed alongside of a motion, or is time more prop-erly the motion as it itself (temporally) exists and proceeds?70
The point is, that if X measures Y, X will be prior to Y – at least for Plotinus. If I usea ruler to measure a piece of paper I may come to the conclusion that the paper is30 centimetres long. It seems counter-intuitive to propose that, in the same way,30 centimetres are one piece of paper long. In the same way, we could imagine amovement that lasts 30 seconds. It seems very counter-intuitive and, indeed, ex-cruciatingly awkward to say that 30 seconds are the movement long. Again, it isnot the purpose of this section to prove or disprove the validity of Plotinus’ argu-ments against Aristotle. Nevertheless, we should not dismiss them too readily. The issue is related to another criticism that Plotinus proposes right afterthe passage quoted above. He remarks that a measure running along with move-ment might not be fit to measure movement in general, but only the particularmovement with which it runs.71 Clark criticizes that Plotinus seems to be deceivedby his own example here: “A concrete line, a given path, may accompany but onemotion; but time accompanies all.”72 Clark again cites Aristotle who had given ananswer to that issue himself:
70 Wagner, The Enigmatic Reality of Time, 332.71 Enn. III.7.9. 20-25: “Καἰf βíος) to another.”ἐJλτἰον τἰJθἐσθαἰ καἰf πἰθανωJ τἐρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temον οὖQ κ ἐQπἰf παJ σή) of soulς) to another.”, αQ λλʹ ῇv  σὖνθἐἰT.”72 Clark, “Time in Plotinus,” 345.
43
Suppose, however, that two things undergo change now, with the res-ult that time would be the number of both changes. Then there is an-other time and there are two equal times at once. Or perhaps this isnot so,  because any time which is  equal and simultaneous with an-other is in fact one and the same time.73
Perhaps the problem lies in Aristotle’s formulation of his theory on mag-nitude, change, and time. Remember that, for him, time is continuous because itfollows a continuous movement, which is in turn continuous because it follows acontinuous  spatial  magnitude.  Aristotle  adds  the  cryptic  note  that  this  is  thereason why “the amount of change corresponds on any occasion to the amount oftime that  seems to have passed.”74 As Coope points out,  this  statement is onlysensible if Aristotle, indeed, focuses on particular movements here, and not move-ment in general: “If A is moving more quickly than B, then in the same period oftime, A’s movement will be greater than B’s. He can make this remark only be-cause he is thinking here of a single moving thing progressing at a uniform rate.”75Is Aristotle inconsistent here? I will not answer this question, but confine my ar-gument to pointing out that Plotinus might not be so wrong after all. We also haveto keep in mind, that Aristotle might be quite content with a theory that relatestime only to particular movements. After all, particulars are the main agents in Ar-
73 Phys.  IV 14, 223b1-4: “αQ λλ' ἐeστἰ νὖT ν κἐκἰνή) of soulT σθαἰ καἰf  αe λλο· ωv ν ἐpκατἐJρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temας) to another.” τή) of soulT ς) to another.” κἰνή) of soulJ σἐως) to another.” ἐἰeή) of soul αh ναQ ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temἰθμοJ ς) to another.”. ἐxτἐρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temος) to another.” οὖ[ ν χρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοJ νος) to another.” ἐeστἰν, καἰf αx μα δὖJ ο ἰeσοἰ χρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοJ νοἰ αh ν ἐἰ[ἐν. ή) of soulh  οὖe ; οp  αὖQ τοf ς) to another.” γαf ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, tem χρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοJ νος) to another.” καἰfἐἰvς) to another.” οp  ἰeσος) to another.” καἰf αx μα.”74 Phys. IV. 11. 219a12-13: “οx σή) of soul γαf ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, tem ή) of soulp  κἰJνή) of soulσἰς) to another.”, τοσοὖT τος) to another.” καἰf οp  χρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοJ νος) to another.” αἰQἐἰf δοκἐἰT γἐγονἐJναἰ.”75 Coope, Time for Aristotle, 50.
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istotle’s  ontology,  whereas  for  Plotinus,  the  good  Platonist,  the  particular  ismerely an imperfect manifestation of higher principles. Besides, we need to be pa-tient with Plotinus’ arguments; remember that he is not yet tackling Aristotle’sapproach head on. He is still concerned with refuting argument (1): time is a mag-nitude running along with movement.In  a  second  line  of  arguments,  Plotinus  investigates  the  measuring  mag-nitude itself more closely. Suppose this time-magnitude does measure motion byvirtue of running along parallel, still it is not clear how it measures and why itmeasures temporally:
Just as the movement, if it had to be measured, could not be measuredby itself but by something else, so is it necessary, if the movement is tohave another measure besides itself, and this was the reason why weneeded the continuous measure for measuring it  – in the same waythere is need of a measure for the magnitude itself, in order that themovement, by fixing at a certain length of that by which it is measuredas being a certain length, may itself be measured.76 
Wagner summarizes the problem by asking, “what accounts for the temporalmagnitude purported to proceed alongside of the motion being itself  a certaintemporal magnitude, being a magnitude of a certain temporal quantity?”77 If we
76 Enn. III.7.9. 37-43: “ἐἰQ  ἐeδἐἰ μἐμἐτρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temή) of soulJ σθαἰ, οὖQ χἰf  ὖp πʹ αὖQ τή) of soulT ς) to another.” ἐeδἐἰ μἐμἐτρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temή) of soulJ σθαἰ, αQ λλʹ ἐpτἐJρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temωw , οὖx τως) to another.”αQ ναJ γκή) of soul, ἐἰeπἐρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, tem μἐJτρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temον ἐxξἐἰ αe λλο ή) of soulp  κἰJνή) of soulσἰς) to another.” παρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temʹ αὖQ τή) of soulJ ν, καἰf δἰαf  τοὖT το ἐQδή) of soulJ θμἐν τοὖT  σὖνἐχοὖT ς) to another.” μἐJτρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοὖἐἰQς) to another.”  μἐJτρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temή) of soulσἰν  αὖQ τή) of soulT ς) to another.”,  τo ν  αὖQ τo ν  τρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temoM πον  δἐἰT  τωTw  μἐγἐJθἐἰ  αὖQ τωTw  μἐJτρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temον  ἰxνʹ  ή) of soulp  κíος) to another.”Mνή) of soulσἰς) to another.”,  τοσοὖT δἐγἐγἐνή) of soulμἐJνοὖ τοὖT  καθ´ οz  μἐτρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temἐἰTταἰ οx σή) of soul, μἐτρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temή) of soulθῇT .”77 Wagner, The Enigmatic Reality of Time, 333.
45
imagine a certain movement we can visualize Plotinus’ problem: how do we knowhow much time the movement took up? According to Plotinus, Aristotle proposeswe  can  know  that  because  there  is  a  certain  magnitude  that  this  movementcoveres and that is, therefore, running along with it. But now, Plotinus asks fur-ther, how do we know how great this magnitude is? We seem to need yet anotherelement, a certain number that this magnitude has, in order for it to measure mo-tion. Therefore, Plotinus proposes that Aristotle’s account requires a second mag-nitude that tells us how great the first magnitude is by endowing the first mag-nitude with a certain temporal quantity. He thus introduces a third element intothe theory, which brings him to investigate argument (2): “And the number of themagnitude which accompanies the movement, but not the magnitude which runsalong with the movement, will be that time which we were looking for.”78 But, as Plotinus points out, this restatement of our approach to the nature oftime leaves us in yet an even greater predicament. For why should this number beanything else than an accumulation of numeric units (μοναδἰκοJ ς) to another.”), a view whichPlotinus already refuted in the beginning. Again, Clark criticizes Plotinus here fornot moving past the notion of time as a digit-like number. Moreover, there is an-other issue that is returning in Plotinus’ critique: if time is a number made up of
78 Enn.  III.7.9. 43-45: “Καἰf  οp  αQ ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temἰθμοf ς) to another.” τοὖT  μἐγἐJθος) to another.” ἐeσταἰ τῇT  κἰνή) of soulJ σἐἰ παρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temομαρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temτοὖT ντος) to another.” ἐQκἐἰTνος) to another.” οpχρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοJ νος) to another.”, αQ λλʹ οὖQ  τοf  μἐJγἐθος) to another.” τοf  σὖνθἐJον τῇT  κἰνή) of soulJ σἐἰ.”
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abstract units, then all we are talking about is a certain amount of time, and nevertime itself:
But what could this be except number made up of abstract units? Andhere the problem must arise of how this abstract number is going tomeasure. Then, even if one does discover how it can, one will not dis-cover time measuring but a certain length of time; and this is not thesame thing as time.79
Plotinus does not pay further heed to the problem that the concept of time as anumber or measure always comes back to time as a digit. He seems to think thathis rationale so far was enough to prove that neither argument (1) nor (2) can es-tablish a satisfying theory of time. (1) proposes that time is magnitude runningalong with motion. This leads to the problem that it cannot be explained how thismagnitude is supposed to measure. (2) tries to answer this conundrum by pro-posing that time is a third element, a number running along with the magnitude.Yet, this restating of the definition leaves us in even greater predicament: it doesnot  clarify  the  relation  between the  movement  and the  measure  and,  what  ismore, it throws us back to the definition of time as constituted of distinct mo-ments – an, thus, as not unified. Clark responds that “the rejection of the digit andthe distinction between time and a unit of time may be legitimate, but neither the
79 Enn. III.7.9. 45-59: “Οὖv τος) to another.” δἐf  τíος) to another.”Mς) to another.” αh ν ἐἰeν ή) of soulh  οp  μοναδἰκoM ς) to another.”; Ος) to another.” οx πως) to another.” μἐτρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temή) of soulJ σἐἰ αQ πορóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temἐἰTν αQ νaM γκή) of soul. Επἐíος) to another.”M,καe ν  τἰς) to another.”  ἐQξἐuM πῇ  οx πως) to another.”,  οὖQ  χρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temoM νον  ἐὖp ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temή) of soulJ σἐἰ  μἐτρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοὖT ντα,  αQ λλαf  τo ν  τοσoM νδἐ  χρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temoM νον.  τοὖT το  δἐf  οὖQταὖQ τo ν χρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temoM νωw . Ετἐρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temον γαf ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, tem ἐἰQπἐἰTν χρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temoM νον, ἐxτἐρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temον δἐf τοσoM νδἐ χρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temoM νον.”
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one nor the other undermines Aristotle’s position.”80 As I indicated earlier though,I think that Clark misses the point here: Plotinus does understand that Aristotlehas tried to make a point against time as a number-like digit himself; but so far itseems that the Aristotelean theory just cannot support that point. The issue might be restated as follows: as we have seen, for Aristotle, time isa continuous measure of a change which continuously spreads over and through acertain magnitude of space. This connection to space ensures both the continuityof the change and the measure, time, since space is the only one of the three ele-ments that is evidently continuous by virtue of being infinitely divisible. Plotinus’answer to Aristotle’s approach now seems to be this: if time is a measure runningalong with movement, then how does it measure the movement? The mere factthat it runs along with movement does not account for that question. Time thenneeds to have a certain countable quantity which endows it with the ability tomeasure or be measured. So far Aristotle and Plotinus agree; remember that, for Aristotle, time was ul-timately the countable aspect of a certain movement or change by which we candetermine the magnitude of that movement. But now Plotinus goes on to say thata number like that is, in fact,  never  continuous; it is always made up of distinctunits – how else would it be countable? But, suppose it somehow could be con-
80 Clark, “Time in Plotinus,” 346.
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tinuous, still Aristotle’s claim that this measure must accompany all motion simul-taneously is, according to Plotinus, not reflected in the Stagirite’s theory of time.Indeed, the measure seems to be always inevitably tied to the  particular move-ment it is measuring. How time transcends these particulars and becomes a meas-ure of all motion seems to remain nebulous. Moreover, nothing has so far been able to account for the temporal quality ofthat line-like magnitude,  or the quantifier of  that magnitude,  which is  runningalong with motion. What makes this measure, which is supposed to be time, actu-ally temporal, and not just any kind of measure? Wagner summarizes the issue infew words:
A temporal measure measures the temporal existence of a motion be-cause the sort of measure it is is a temporal measure. This is the sort ofmeasure it  is,  however,  just  because it  is  or  utilizes  some temporalquantity. And this quantity is a temporal quantity because it is quantifi-able and the sort of quantifier which quantifies it is a temporal quanti-fier. But, what accounts for a quantifier being a temporal quantifier?81
Any kind of measure that measures temporally in this way presupposes timeitself, just as a temporally existent motion presupposes time, as Plotinus arguedagainst  the  identification  of  time  and  movement  itself.82 This  point  is  tied  toPlotinus’ critique that Aristotle’s time is always only measuring particular move-
81 Wagner, The Enigmatic Reality of Time, 334.82 Ibid.
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ments. As he points out, “before saying ‘a certain length of time’ one ought to saywhat it is that is of a certain length.”83 Here, I think, lies the main issue that splitsPlotinus and Aristotle. Aristotle is quite fine with noting how time appears phe-nomenally and induce from that a general theory about it. Plotinus, the stern Pla-tonist, will not accept a science moving like that because he thinks the appear-ances need to be derived from their principles, and not the other way around. But, maybe – and here Plotinus moves into argument (3) – what makes timemeasure temporally is not something other than the temporal measure, but rathera distinctive way in which it measures, namely by running along with movementand measuring it according to before and after. Definition (3) is, therefore, an at-tempt to specify (2) and explain how time measures motion. The three attemptsat defining time as the measure of motion are not distinctly different from eachother, but (2) was a response to (1), which was not able to answer the questionhow time measures and why temporally. Now, that Plotinus has shown that (2) isnot satisfactory in this regard, as well, he tries one last time to improve on thedefinition.(3) can be seen as closest to Aristotle’s actual definition: time is the numberof motion measuring according to before and after.84 Yet, Plotinus immediately cri-
83 Enn. III.7.9. 49-51: “πρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temo  γαJ ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, tem τοὖT  τοσoM νδἐ δἐἰT οx  τíος) to another.”M ποτʹ ἐQστíος) to another.”ν ἐἰQπἐἰTν ἐQκἐἰTνο, οx  τοσoM νδἐ ἐQστíος) to another.”ν.” Seealso Enn. III.7.9. 77-78: “ΕἰQ μή) of soulJ  τἰς) to another.” αQ πολαβíος) to another.”ωf ν μἐJρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temος) to another.” τἰ αὖQ τo ν μἐτρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοἰT, ἐQν ωvw  σὖμβíος) to another.”αíος) to another.”Mνἐἰ ἐἰ[ναἰ καíος) to another.” πρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temíος) to another.”νμἐτρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temή) of soulθή) of soulT ναἰ.”84  Enn. III.7.9. 56-57.
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ticizes that also the proponent of (3) may not be absolved from the problem that(1) and (2) have as well: what exactly is it that makes our measure measure tem-porally or, in this case, according to the before-and-after? Thus Plotinus begins hiscritique by stating that “it is not yet clear what this number which measures bythe sequence of ‘before’ and ‘after’ is.”85 Definition (3) still begs the question, inso-far it does not explain what exactly it is about the measure that makes it a tem-poral one. First of all, there is more than one before and after; there is the tem-poral before and after and the spatial before and after. Remember, that Aristotlederives the temporal from the spatial before and after. He grounds the temporalcontinuity of a movement in the spatial magnitude over and in which this move-ment happens. Plotinus seems to wish to maintain the priority of temporality overspatiality.86 Given his Platonic background it may not be surprising that he clasheswith Aristotle over this issue. Thus Plotinus insists that “in general, ‘before’ and‘after’ mean, ‘before,’ the time which stops at the ‘now,’ and ‘after,’ the time whichbegins from the ‘now.’”87 So to define time as a measure that measures motion inaccordance to before and after is somewhat unclear as to why the measure meas-ures actually the temporal before and after of the movement, and not the spatialone.
85 Enn. III.7. 9. 57-58: “Ἀλλ' οὖ[ ν καταf  τo  πρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temoM τἐρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temον καíος) to another.” ὖx στἐρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temον οὖe πωδ  ή) of soulT λος) to another.” οx στἰς) to another.” ἐQστíος) to another.”Mν.”86 Wagner, The Enigmatic Reality of Time, 335. 87 Enn. III.7. 9. 64-66: “Εστἰ γαQ ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, tem οx λως) to another.” τo  πρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temoM τἐρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temον καíος) to another.” ὖx στἐρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temον τo  μἐfν χρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temoM νος) to another.” οp  ἐἰQς) to another.” τo  νὖT ν λή) of soulJ γων,τo  δἐf  ὖx στἐρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temον οz ς) to another.” αQ πo  τοὖT  νὖT ν αe ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temχἐταἰ.”
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However, let us grant that time measures the temporal before and after ofmovement. After all, it is time we are talking about; it seems justified to assumethat a temporal  measure measures the temporality  of  movement,  and not anyother kind. Still, Plotinus insists that a measure that measures according to beforeand after measures according to time; and thus this kind of measurement cannotbe itself time because it presupposes time. Definition (3), therefore, 
purports to give an account of time whereas it instead gives an accountof something which presupposes time – or which at most is a manifest-ation or, perhaps, a consequence of time – ans so in that sense as wellit begs-the-question regarding the reality and nature of time as such,
as Wagner summarizes.88Moreover, if it is true that definition (3) is question begging, then it also doesnot solve the issue why a number that measures motion, temporally or otherwise,should be anything else than an aggregation of numeric units. In his critique of(2), Plotinus maintains that a temporal magnitude is not itself time, but presup-poses time. Otherwise time would be constituted of these temporal quantities, in-stead of being one unified phenomenon. To redress these temporal quantities asbefore-now and after-now does not help this issue, it merely gives it a differentname.
88 Wagner, The Enigmatic Reality of Time, 336.
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Plotinus summarizes his criticisms in few remarks at the end of Ennead III.7.9. First, he insists that none of the three possible definition that he proposes canexplain why the number of motion should be temporal, and not just any kind ofnumber. Thus he now asserts again that “when number is added to movement [...]why should time result from its presence [...]?”89 Second, if time is truly continu-ous it cannot be measured, nor itself be a measure or number because number isan aggregation, not a unity: “since time is, and is said to be unbounded, how couldit have a number?”90 These summarizing questions conclude Plotinus’ engagement with the opin-ions of other philosophers. In the next chapter, I will provide a close reading andinterpretation of Plotinus’ own account in which he attempts to solve the prob-lems that he identified in other theories. 
89 Enn. III.7. 9. 68-74: “αQ λλ' οὖ[ ν δἰαf  τíος) to another.”M αQ ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temἰθμοὖT  μἐfν γἐνομἐJνοὖ χρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temoM νος) to another.” ἐeσταἰ.”90 Enn. III.7. 9. 76-77: “Ἀπἐíος) to another.”Mρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοὖ δἐf  τοὖT  χρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temoM νοο οe ντος) to another.” καíος) to another.” λἐγομἐJνοὖ πωT ς) to another.” αh ν πἐρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temíος) to another.” αὖQ τo ν αQ ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temἰθμo ς) to another.”ἐἰeν;”
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CHAPTER 3 PLOTINUS’ ACCOUNT OF TIME
In this chapter, I will finally focus on Plotinus’ own positive theory of time.We will see how he himself tries to solve the problems set out in the previouschapter: how to devise a theory of time that honours the logical priority and onto-logical unity of time. I have argued in chapter 1 that Plotinus already makes an im-plicit argument in the refutation of his predecessors; I proposed that we must,with Plotinus, make a distinction between Time – the cosmological principle ofchange – and temporality which is an attribute of the phenomenal universe. In therefutation of his predecessors, Plotinus’ argument stays in the negative; yet, westill can work our way through Plotinus’ arguments to see the ground on which hetries to refute the other opinions. All of these opinions try to place Time in thephenomenal realm, either as movement, or the moved, or the interval of move-ment, or a measure of movement. In all these opinions, time is something that ap-
pears. And precisely on this ground, Plotinus is able to attack them – he points outthat it does not seem to be possible to view Time as something phenomenal. Forthis reason, Plotinus argues for the conceptual separation of the temporality thatis visible in the appearing things – becoming and ceasing – from the principle ofthis movement, which he thinks is more fit to be called “Time.”In his own account, he sets out to do precisely this: conceptualize Time asthe principle of the dispersion of the ideals; and only after this dispersion, then, ischange possible – for change requires multiplicity. This account of Time is,  not
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surprisingly,  consequent  on  Plotinus’  basic  ontology.  Whatever  criticisms  onemight level at Plotinus, it would be hard for anyone to deny that his thinking ishighly systematic and philosophically consistent with his first principles. Plotinus’theory of  Time relies heavily on the structure and creative power of  his  thirdὖp ποJ στασἰς) to another.”, the Soul; for this reason, I shall take a detour before I delve into thetopic of Time itself, and provide a short summary of Soul as an ontological prin-ciple in section 2.1. In section 2.2, I will then focus on Plotinus’ theory of Time.Here, I must emphasize that he casts his own theory in the form of a myth. Thiscannot surprise us; the theory of Time is bound up with the theory of Soul’s em -anation from the Intellect and the One, which is a myth as well. It seems befittingthat Plotinus formulates the theory of Time in the same way. 
3.1 THE STRUCTURE OF SOUL AND THE SENSIBLE
First, we need to develop a clear understanding of Plotinus’ concept of Soulbefore we can inquire into the nature of Time. It needs to be noted that Plotinususes the term “soul” in a myriad of ways. There is the ὖp ποJ στασἰς) to another.” Soul, which is thethird and lowest of the divine principles of reality. This principle disperses itselfinto several cosmological tiers of entities and functions. Deepa Majumdar classi-fies these tiers in three levels: the Absolute Soul (αὖQ τοψὖχή) of soulJ ); the ὖp ποJ στασἰς) to another.” Soulwhich is the unified cosmological principal (παT σα ψὖχή) of soulJ );  and lower species of
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souls, which are generated by the creative power of the ὖp ποJ στασἰς) to another.” Soul. Amongthose are the World Soul (ψὖχή) of soulJ  τοὖ παντοJ ς) to another.”) and our individual souls.91The highest form of soul is the Absolute Soul (αὖQ τοψὖχή) of soulJ ), which is the ar-chetype of the Soul in the Intellect: 
But is there, before the individual soul, and before the universal soulthe Absolute Soul or Life? [We must] say that Absolute Soul must be inIntellect before Soul comes to be in order that it may come to be.92
This form of Soul is not yet the ὖp ποJ στασἰς) to another.”; it does not leave the Intellect (νοὖT ς) to another.”)(which is the second cosmic ὖp ποJ στασἰς) to another.” and, therefore, the principle of Soul andeverything below) to become a principle on its own. The ὖp ποJ στασἰς) to another.” Soul is estab-lished only through the creative power of the Intellect.  It is  an expression andactivity that stems from the Intellect and moves around it:
This  activity  springing  from  the  substance  of  the  Intellect  is  Soul,which comes to be this while Intellect abides unchanged. […] But Souldoes not abide unchanged when it produces: it is moved and so bringsforth an image.93
91 Deepa Majumdar, Plotinus on the Appearance of Time and the World of Sense (Hampton: Ashg-ate, 2007), 44.92 Enn. V.9. 14. 20-23: “Πἐρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temἰf δἐf  αe λλή) of soulν καθοJ λοὖ, καἰf τή) of soulT ς) to another.” καθοJ λοὖ αὖQ τοψὖχή) of soulQ ν ή) of soule τοἰ τή) of soulf ν ζωή) of soulQ ν; ή) of soule  ἐQννωTw  πρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temἰfν γἐνἐJσθαἰ ψὖχή) of soulQ ν, ἰxνα καἰf  γἐJνή) of soulταἰ, αὖQ τοψὖχή) of soulQ ν ἐQκἐἰJνή) of soulν λἐJγἐἰν.” Majumdar,  Appearance of
Time, 44.93 Enn. V.2. 1. 15-20: “καἰf αὖx τή) of soul ἐQκ τή) of soulT ς) to another.” οὖQ σἰJας) to another.” ἐQνἐJρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temγἐἰα ψὖχή) of soulT ς) to another.” τοὖT το μἐJνοντος) to another.” ἐQκἐἰJνοὖ γἐνομἐJνή) of soul[...] ή) of soulp  δἐf  οὖQ  μἐJνοὖσα ποἰἐἰT, αQ λλαf  κἰνή) of soulθἐἰTσα ἐQγἐJννα ἐἰeδωλον.”
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Soul is thus a lesser image of Intellect (ἐἰQκωJ ν νοὖT ).94 While the totality ofνοὖT ς) to another.” dissolves the multiplicity of being in its own simplicity, the essence of Soul isthe unfolding of this unified manifold into distinct moments. Halfwassen pointsout that when Plotinus speaks of the “image” of Intellect, he  means “visibility,” or“making visible” what is in itself invisible in the Intellect: the multiplicity of be-ing.95 Plotinus explains this relation using an allegory:
Just as a thought in its utterance is an image of the thought in soul, sosoul itself is the expressed thought of Intellect, and its whole activity,and the life which it sends out to establish another reality.96
The  outspoken  thought  is  the  verbally  manifested  representation  of  the  purethought in soul, and just as the expression of the thought into language does nottake anything from the thought that is purely and solely in thinking, so too doesthe expression of the infolded multiplicity within Intellect into the outfolded mul-tiplicity of Soul not take anything away from the unity and simplicity of its source.The emanation of one reality (ὖp ποJ στασἰς) to another.”) from another, which does not alteror take anything from the original reality, is a metaphysical concept of utmost im-portance in Plotinus’ ontology; it ensures 1) that none of the ὖp ποσταJ σἐἰ have togive anything up, or move towards something that is outside of themselves. This is
94 Enn. V.1. 3. 5-10.95 Halfwassen, Plotin und der Neuplatonismus, 98.96 Enn. V.1. 3. 5-10: “καἰJπἐρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, tem γαf ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, tem οὖ[ σα χρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temή) of soulT μα οἰvον ἐeδἐἰξἐν οp  λοJ γος) to another.”, ἐἰQκωJ ν τἰJς) to another.” ἐQστἰ νοὖT . οἰvον λοJγος) to another.” οpἐQν πρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοφορóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temαTw  λοJγοὖ τοὖT  ἐQν ψὖχή) of soulT , οὖx τω τοἰ καἰf αὖQ τή) of soulf  λοJγος) to another.” νοὖT  καἰf ή) of soulp  παT σα ἐQνἐJρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temγἐἰα καἰf ή) of soulz ν πρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοἰἐταἰζοή) of soulf ν ἐἰQς) to another.” αe λλοὖ ὖp ποJ στασἰν.”
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the underlying concept of Plotinus’ puzzling assurance that Soul “gives itself tomultiplicity and does not give itself.”97 Soul is expressing its own nature in an out-ward activity without undergoing change or movement towards that to which itgives birth. 2) This kind of emanation allows Plotinus to explain how the One (ἐxν)as the highest principle (ὖp ποJ στασἰς) to another.”) is present throughout all the lower layers ofreality.  Intellect,  the  unified  plethora  of  being,  is  an  “image  of  the  Absolute”(ἐἰQκοJ να ἐQκἐἰJνοὖ),98 just as Soul is an image of Intellect. And just as we saw that thepure thought in the soul finds its manifest expression in language, so too does theIntellect express the unified manifold which is its nature (οὖQ σἰJα)99 in a spread-outmanifold that has its own existence apart from Intellect: the Soul.100 And just asSoul remains unchanged while giving birth, so too does Intellect:
But one must understand that the activity on the level of Intellect doesnot  flow out  of  it,  but  the  external  activity comes into  existence assomething distinct.101
97 Enn.  IV.  9.  5.  1-5: “ἐQκἐἰJνή) of soul μἐfν  οὖ[ ν  μἰJα,  αἰp  δἐJ  πολλαἰf  ἐἰQς) to another.”  ταὖJ τή) of soulν ωp ς) to another.”  μἰJαν δοὖT σαν ἐpαὖτή) of soulJ ν ἐἰQς) to another.”πλή) of soulT θος) to another.” καἰf οὖQ  δοὖT σαν.”98 Enn. V.1. 7. 1.99 Enn.  V.9. 5. 20-25.:“The objects of his [Intellect’s] thought must exist before the universe, notimpressions from other things but archetypes and primary and the substance of Intellect.” “πρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοfτοὖT  κοJ σμοὖ αe ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temα δἐἰT  ἐἰ[ναἰ ἐQκἐἰTνα, οὖQ  τὖJ ποὖς) to another.” αQ φʹ ἐpτἐJρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temων, αQ λλαf  καἰf  αQ ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temχἐJτὖπα καἰf  πρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temωT τα καἰf  νοὖTοὖQ σἰJαν.”100 Halfwassen points out that the Greek term that Plotinus uses for “existence” is ὖp ποJ στασἰς) to another.”. Heliterally translates this term to the German “Niederschlag”, a term used, for example, for the sedi-ments on the bottom of a bottle of wine. I think its best English representation in this context is“condensation” (like the condensation of steam on a window). So, to follow Plotinus’ metaphor, In -tellect is expressing its own nature which then ‘condenses’ and forms something that is rather likeit, yet has its own nature and existence apart from it. Halfwassen, Plotin und der Neuplatonismus,98.
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So, the metaphor of emanation does not describe an emergence of the Intel-lect out of itself. Rather, Intellect always stays resting in itself, but its inward activ-ity produces another outward activity and reality, in which the unified nature ofIntellect separates into the manifold, as Halfwassen describes it.102 Soul is this out-ward activity (πρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοφορóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temαJ ),103 which gains its own separate existence, but neverthe-less is from Intellect. 
But one must understand that the activity on the level of Intellect doesnot  flow out  of  it,  but  the  external  activity comes into  existence assomething distinct.104
Soul is, therefore, in the centre of Plotinus’ ontological order; there is beingbelow and above it.105 Soul is in between the indivisible νοὖT ς) to another.” and the divisiblesensible beings. Because of that it is also itself both divisible and indivisible. At itsupper summit Soul is an archetypal form united with Intellect. At its lower end itcreates and shares in the sensible.106 Intellect is the “One-Many” (ἐxν πολλαJ ): mani-fold because of its structure as intellection, but unified because this intellection is
101 Enn. V.1. 3. 10-15: “δἐἰT δἐf  λαβíος) to another.”ἐἰTν ἐQκἐἰT  οὖQ κ ἐQκρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temἐJοὖσαν, αQ λλαf  μἐJνοὖσαν μἐJν τή) of soulf ν ἐQν αὖQ τωTw , τή) of soulf ν δἐfαe λλή) of soulν ὖp φἰσταμἐJνή) of soulν.”102 Halfwassen, Plotin und der Neuplatonismus, 99.103 Enn. V.1. 3. 7.104 Enn. V1. 3. 11-12: “δἐἰT δἐf  βíος) to another.”αλἐἰTν ἐQκἐἰT οὖQ κ ἐQκρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temἐJοὖσαν, αQ λλαf  μἐJνοὖσαν μἐfν τή) of soulf ν ἐQν αὖQ τωTw , τή) of soulf ν δἐfαe λλή) of soulν ὖp φἰσταμἐJνή) of soulν.”105 Majumdar, Appearance of Time, 45-46.106 Ibid.
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self-intellection; subject and object are identical. Soul is the “one and many” (ἐxνκαἰJ πολλαJ ) because it is unified in itself, but dispersed throughout its creations.107 We see this dual nature of Soul also in its activity. Because Soul is the outgo-ing being of Intellect, it also imitates Intellect’s activity:
Since then its existence derives from Intellect soul is intellectual, andits intellect is discursive reasoning, and its perfection comes from In-tellect, like a father who brings to maturity a son whom he begat im-perfect in comparison with himself.108
The nature of Soul is intellectual. But its intellection is unlike νοJ ή) of soulσἰς) to another.” in Intellect,which is self-intellection as self-realization of the unified Being. Soul’s intellectionis realized in calculative thoughts (λογἰσμοἰJ). These thoughts constitute Being notas unified, but as spread out into the multiplicity of beings, through which theymove discursively. This discursivity is the fundamental difference of Soul from In-tellect: whereas Intellect’s noetic activity, or self-intellection, is a “being alwaysalready at its destination” because it is always already identical with its object,Soul’s  dianoetic  thinking is  always  a  “being  on  the  way.”  And  as  this  ongoingsearch for the intelligible, Soul is the dispersed activity of the Intellect which is al-ways already there.109 
107 Enn. V.1. 8. 25-30.108 Enn. V.1. 3. 10-15: “οὖ[ σα οὖ[ ν αQ ποf  νοὖT  νοἐρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temαJ  ἐQστἰ, καἰf ἐQν λογἰσμοἰTς) to another.” οp  νοὖT ς) to another.” αὖQ τή) of soulT ς) to another.” καἰf ή) of soulp  τἐλἐἰJοσἰς) to another.”αQ πʹ αὖQ τοὖT  παJ σἰν οἰvον πατρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοf ς) to another.” ἐQκθπἐJψαντος) to another.”, οz ν οὖQ  τἐJλἐἰος) to another.” ωp ς) to another.” πρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοf ς) to another.” αὖp τοJ ν ἐQγἐJννή) of soulσἐν.”109 Halfwassen, Plotin und der Neuplatonismus, 99.
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As Intellect’s inward self-intellection unfolds the unity of Being into the mul-tiplicity of the intelligible beings, so too does Soul unfold itself into the multipli-city of its thoughts, which become the λογοἰJ, rational principles that are dispersedimages of the intelligibles (ἐἰeδή) of soul). And just like the inward self-unfolding of Intel-lect creates an outward unfolding into Soul, so too does Soul, through its discurs-ive thinking of the λογοἰJ, create the world of discrete singulars: the sensible phe-nomena, which exist apart from each other, and in succession. Through this metaphysics of consecutive emanation Plotinus builds an onto-logy,  all  layers of which are ultimately a manifestation of the One itself,  whichgives unity and being to everything below. The One is this Absolute Unity itself,and therefore absolutely beyond Being. The Intellect is the infolded unity of Being,and therefore the One-Many (ἐxν πολλαJ ). Soul unfolds this unity into multiplicitywhile it still remains unified, and is therefore the One-and-Many (ἐxν καἰJ  πολλαJ ).The rational forms of individual phenomena that Soul creates are only Many-and-One (πολλαJ  καἰJ  ἐxν)  because  the  Soul  distinguishes  unity  and  multiplicity;  yetsince the rational forms stay immanent in Soul, they are still unified in their be-longing to Soul:
So the soul is one and many in this way: the forms in body are manyand one; bodies are many only.110
110 Enn. IV.1. 2. 50-55: “ἐeστἰν οὖ[ ν ψὖχή) of soulf  ἐzν καἰf πολλαf  οὖx τως) to another.”. ταf  δἐf  ἐQν τοἰTς) to another.” σωJ μασἰν ἐἰeδή) of soul πολλαf  καἰfἐxν. ταf  δἐf σωJ ματα πολλαf  μοJ νον.”
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While the forms of the phenomena (σωJ ματα) remain unified in their immanencein Soul, the sensible phenomena are only many. They dissolve into the divergenceof space and succession of time. Yet, although all three ὖp ποJ στασἐἰς) to another.” maintain theirown natures respectively, they are not, in fact, independent from each other. Sincereality  is  principled  by  the  One  from top  to  bottom,  Plotinus’  cosmology  is  alayered ontology, but not an ontology of layers, we might say. Reality is ultimatelyunified, but shows forth a hierarchy of principles; but these principles are not in-dependent phenomena (in fact, most of them are not phenomenal at all.) Hence,not even sensible Nature is on its own. Rather, it is the lower nature of Soul andmanifestation of Soul’s activity; Soul, in turn, is the lower nature of Intellect andthe manifestation of Intellect’s activity.Here,  we can get  back to  explaining the  nature  of  Time  and  temporalitywithin Plotinus’ philosophy. In the course of the following section we will see howthe structure of Time and temporality – laid out in a myth of origination – closelyfollows the structure of Soul.
3.2 TIME – THE ACTIVITY OF SOUL
Plotinus thinks of Soul as the principle of the dispersion of unity into multi-plicity. And while the unity of Being remains at rest in eternity, Plotinus makesTime into the mode of this dispersion. In  Ennead  III.7. 11, he puts forward thefamous definition that “time is the life (ζωή) of soulJ )  of soul in a movement of passage
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from one way of life (βíος) to another.”íος) to another.”Mος) to another.”) to another.”111 According to Beierwaltes, βíος) to another.”íος) to another.”Mος) to another.” refershere to different stages or states (modi vivendi) or the different phases of life ingeneral,  which are distinguished by what is before and after; ζωή) of soulJ  on the otherhand means an active force carrying the βíος) to another.”íος) to another.”Mος) to another.”.112 Thus, we now face the task of un-packing what exactly Plotinus means when he speaks of the “life of Soul,” and whyhe uses two different terms for it. I will argue, that by “life” Plotinus refers to theactivity of Soul, which is discursive thinking (δἰαJ νοἰα) and that the twofoldness ofthis life follows the structure of the double act of creation – inward and outward –which I described above.It is most worthy of noting that Plotinus’ argumentation, which leads up tothe quoted passage, takes the form of a “myth of the fall, in which through bold-ness and the desire to be self-causing pre-existent ‘Mind’  [νοὖT ς) to another.”] lapsed into thecondition of soulishness,” as Manchester explains.113 Hence, the story of origina-tion is not to be taken literally. Plotinus rather illustrates metaphysical principlesthrough the use of mythology. This means that there was no point in time whenthis lapse or fall happened; these are images for cosmic principles whose powersare active at every moment. As Clark explains, “although the text says that the Soulafter a period of rest chose to seek a fuller life and started to move, the truth is
111 Enn. III.7. 11. 42-45: “ΕἰQ οὖ[ ν χρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temoM νον λἐJγοἰ ψὖχή) of soulT ς) to another.” ἐQν κἰνή) of soulJ σἐἰ μἐταβíος) to another.”ατἰκῇT  ἐQξ αe λλοὖ ἐἰQς) to another.” αe λλον βíος) to another.”íος) to another.”Mονζωή) of soulf ν ἐἰ[ναἰ, α[ ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temʹ αh ν δοκοἰT τἰ λἐJγἐἰν;”112 Beierwaltes, Plotinus (Enneade III.7), 268.113 Manchester, “Time and the Soul,” 102.
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that this curious power of the Soul has always been active.”114 This point is sup-ported by the Platonic assertion that the cosmos does not have a temporal begin-ning, but is a logical derivation from higher principles.115 The first indication of theallegorical character of the account is that Plotinus begins with a reference to theMuses: “one could hardly, perhaps, call on the Muses, who did not then yet exist,to tell  us ‘how time first  came out’.”116 Although the Muses are dismissed as asource of information about the origin of time here, their appearance is, neverthe-less,  a  clear  indicator  for  the  mythical  form  of  what  follows,  as  Manchesternotes.117 Moreover, as we will see, the agents of the following story, Time and Soul,are asked to answer for themselves; the abstract concepts at play are personifiedand enter into dialogue with each other. Manchester notes that Plotinus can takeadvantage of the fact that Greek is a gendered language; hence, the personal pro-nouns “he” (for Time) and “she” (for Soul) are able to indicate the distinctionsmore clearly than can English, in which they both are referred to by “it.” For thisreason, Manchester has adapted Armstrong’s translation of the text accordingly,which I found useful for the purposes of this thesis.118
114 Clark, “Time in Plotinus,” 353-354.115 Ibid., 354.116 Enn. III.7. 11. 7: “οx πως) to another.” δή) of soulf  πρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temωT τον ἐfξἐJπἐσἐ χρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temoM νος) to another.”, ταf ς) to another.” μἐfν ΜοuM σας) to another.” οὖe πω τoM τἐ οὖe σας) to another.” οὖQ κ αe ντἰς) to another.” ἰeσως) to another.” καλοἰT ἐἰQπἐἰTν τοὖT το.”117 Manchester, “Time and the Soul,” 121.118 Ibid., 116-119. The remaining quotations in this chapter follow Manchester’s alterations. I onlychange the personal pronouns referring to time and Soul. I ignore all other alterations Manchesterhas made to Armstrong’s translation.
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We must take ourselves back to the disposition which we said existedin eternity, to that quiet life, all a single whole, still unbounded, alto-gether without declination,  resting in and directed towards eternity.Time did not yet exist, not at any rate for the beings of that world; weshall produce time by means of the form and nature of what comesafter.119
These words form the introduction to the story. Before time existed, there wasonly a state of eternity which is defined as “quiet,” “whole,” “without declination,”and “resting.” This  quote  confronts  us  with  an important  question:  what  does  Plotinusmean by “we” when he says that  we must take ourselves back (αQ ναγαγἐἰTν ή) of soulp μαT ς) to another.”αὖQ τοὖf ς) to another.”), and that we have produced Time (ἐἰQρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temγαJ σμἐθα, γἐννή) of soulJ σομἐν)?120 I followMachester and Baracat and reject a reading that interprets this “we” as individualsubjects (αἰp  ψὖχαἰJ). Both of them point towards a passage in chapter 13 of  En-
nead III.7, where Plotinus states that Time is in all individual souls (including theWorld-Soul, ψὖχή) of soulJ  τοὖT  παντοJ ς) to another.”) not because they bring Time into being, but be-cause they share in the ὖp ποJ στασἰς) to another.” Soul (παT σα ψὖχή) of soulJ ): “Is time, then, also in us? Itis in every soul of this kind, and in the same form in every one of them, and all areone.”121 Time must be in every individual soul by participation only,  otherwise
119 Enn.  III.7. 11. 1-7: “ΔἐἰT  δή) of soulf  αQ ναγαγἐἰTν ή) of soulp μαT ς) to another.” αὖQ τοὖf ς) to another.” πaM λἰν ἐἰQς) to another.” ἐQκἐíος) to another.”Mνή) of soulν τή) of soulf ν δἰaMθἐσἰν ή) of soulz ν ἐQπἰf  τοὖTαἰQωT νος) to another.” ἐQλἐfγομἐν ἐἰ[ναἰ,  τή) of soulf ν  αQ τρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temἐμή) of soulT  ἐQκἐíος) to another.”Mνή) of soulν καἰf  οp μοὖT  παT σαν καἰf  αe πἐἰρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temον ή) of soule δή) of soul ζωή) of soulf ν καἰf  αQ κλἰνή) of soulTπaM ντή) of soul καἰf  ἐQν ἐpνἰf  καἰf  πρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοf ς) to another.” ἐzν ἐpστωT σαν. Χρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temoM νος) to another.” δἐf  οὖe τω ή) of soul[ ν, ή) of soulh  ἐQκἐíος) to another.”Mνος) to another.” γἐ οὖQ κ ή) of soul[ ν, γἐννή) of soulJ σομἐν δἐfχρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temoM νον λoM γωw  καἰf φuM σἐἰ τοὖT  ὖp στἐJρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοὖ.”120 Enn. III.7. 11. 1, 6, 19.121 Enn. III.7.11. 13. 66-70: “Ἀρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temʹ οὖ[ ν καἰf ἐQν ή) of soulp μἰTν χρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temoM νος) to another.”; Ἢ ἐQν ψὖχῇT  τῇT  τοἰαὖJ τῇ παJ σῇ καἰf οp μοἐἰδωT ς) to another.”ἐQν πaMσῇ καἰf  αἰp  παT σαἰ μíος) to another.”Mα. Δἰοf  οὖQ  δἰασπασθή) of soulJ σἐταἰ οp  χρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temoM νοσ· ἐQπἐἰf οὖQ δ οp  αἰQωf ν οp  κατʹ αe λλο ἐQν τοἰTς) to another.”
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Time would be split up among the multiplicity of the individual souls, and everysoul would produce her own Time.122 “We,” then, in line 1 is to be understood asan editorial we. It refers to the lecturer who speaks about the nature of Time andto the lecturer’s audience.123 The “we” in lines 6 and 19 must be interpreted differently, though. Baracattakes it as “a metaphysical ‘we’;” for him, it stands for the ὖp ποJ στασἰς) to another.” Soul and, byparticipation  only,  for  the  World-Soul  and  the  individual  souls,  as  well.124Manchester sees these lines as more significant than Baracat. He argues that “we,”in this case,  actually means “we, the speakers and readers,”  who must expresswhat Time – asked to speak for himself – can only say  silently. Hence, “we haveconstructed time” is a surrogate for Time saying “I have constructed myself” -which is what Soul, breaking from Intellect, would like to say, and what Time, in-deed, does say.125 The significance, for Manchester, does not lie in our speaking forTime, but rather in Time’s silence. He says that Time’s silence should be seen inthe context  of  an earlier text,  Ennead  III.8,126 in  which Plotinus uses the samemode of exposition, asking sensible Nature why she makes things, and lets her an-swer for herself. This is what she says:
οp μοἐἰδἐJσἰ παT σἰν.” Manchester, “Time and the Soul,” 120; Baracat, “Soul’s Desire,” 32-33.122 Ibid.123 Manchester, “Time and the Soul,” 120. 124 Baracat, “Soul’s Desire,” 33.125 Manchester, “Time and the Soul,” 121.126 According to the chronology of Plotinus’ treatises, Enn. III.8 is treatise 30, Enn. III.7 is treatise45.
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You ought not to ask, but to understand in silence, you, too, just as I amsilent  and not  in  the  habit  of  talking.  Understand what,  then? Thatwhat comes into being is what I see in my silence, an object of contem-plation which comes to be naturally, and that I, originating from thissort of contemplation have a contemplative nature.127
According to Manchester this silently – which means “naturally,” as we see in thequote – executed activity is a most important feature of Soul and of Time, as well;for, as we shall see, Time is this silent activity of Soul. In an earlier, shorter treatiseon time, Ennead IV. 4 [28]. 15-17, Plotinus follows this line. Manchester summar-izes the position as follows:
In  [...] chapter 15 he [Plotinus] had established that souls, which areeternal,  rank higher than Time, which in turn ranks higher than thethings which are in Time, namely the affections and doings of souls.128
Here, Time is  in  Soul not in the sense of  Ennead III.7, where Time is in Soul be-cause it is Soul’s activity, but in the very direct sense that there is something ofSoul both above and below Time: above it is the eternal ὖp ποJ στασἰς) to another.”, and below arethe temporal and sensible productions of the ψὖχαἰJ.129 In Ennead IV.4. 16, Plotinusexplores the relationship between the temporal structure of sensible Nature – the‘one thing after another’ – in comparison to the order of the higher Soul. Here, a
127 Enn. III.8. 4. 3-7: “Εχρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temή) of soulT ν μἐfν μή) of soulf  ἐQρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temωταT ν, αQ λλαf  σὖνἰἐJναἰ καíος) to another.” αὖQ τo ν σἰωπῇT , ωx πἐρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, tem ἐQγωf  σἰωπωT  καíος) to another.”οὖQ κ  ἐἰeθἰσμαἰ  λἐJγἐἰ.  Τíος) to another.”M  οὖ[ ν  σὖνἰἐJναἰ;  Οτἰ  τo  γἐνoM μἐνoM ν  ἐQστἰ  θἐJαμα ἐQμoM ν,  σἰωπωJ σή) of soulς) to another.”,  καíος) to another.”  φὖJ σἐἰγἐνoM μἐνον  θἐωJ ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temή) of soulμα,  καíος) to another.”M  μοἰ  γἐνομἐJνῇ  ἐQκ  θἐωρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temíος) to another.”Mας) to another.”  τή) of soulT ς) to another.”  ωp δíος) to another.”  τή) of soulf ν  φὖJ σἰν  ἐeχἐἰν  φἰλοθἐαJ μοναὖp παJ ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temχἐἰν.”128 Manchester, “Time and the Soul,” 122.129 Ibid.
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distinct problem arises:  if  the temporal structure is also the order of Soul,  theeternal nature of Soul is destroyed; if, on the other hand, Soul has a different orderthan sensible Nature, then there are two orders, the relation of which will be hardto establish. As Plotinus says, 
Now if the arranging principle is other than the arrangement, it will beof such a kind as to speak, in a way; but if that which gives orders is theprimary arrangement, it no longer says, but only makes this after that.For if it says it, it does so with its eye on the arrangement. How then isit the same? Because the arranging principle is not form and matter,but only form and power, and Soul is the second active actuality afterIntellect; but the ‘this after that’ is in the [material] things which can-not all exist at once.130
If  the ordering principle of Soul were different from the order of sensibleNature, Soul would act in a speaking kind of way in opposition to the silent activityof Nature. This is not permissible. The ordering and the ordered cannot be madedifferent in the way that the ordered would become external to the ordering. For,as I mentioned in the previous section on the structure of Soul, sensible Nature isnot exterior to the Soul; rather, sensible Nature is the lower manifestation of Soul
itself,  of  Soul’s  creative  power.  Plotinus  reiterates  this  point  in  the  quotationabove: Soul is not form and matter, but form and power, and the backdrop of this
130 Enn.  IV.4.  16.  13-21:  “ή) of soulh  ἐἰQ  μἐfν  αe λλο τo  ταJ ττον καíος) to another.”  ή) of soulp  ταJ ξἰς) to another.”,  οὖx τως) to another.” ωp ς) to another.”  οἰvον  λἐJγἐἰν·  ἐἰQ  δἐf  τoἐQπἰστατοὖT ν ή) of soulp  πρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temωJ τον ταJ ξἰς) to another.”, οὖQ κἐJτἰ λἐJγἐἰ, αQ λλαf  ποἰἐἰT μoM νον τoM δἐ μἐταf  τoM δἐ. ἐἰQ γαf ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, tem λἐJγἐἰ, ἐἰQς) to another.” ταJ ξἰνπλἐJπων λἐJγἐἰ·ωx στἐ ἐxτἐρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temον τή) of soulT ς) to another.” ταJ ξἐως) to another.” ἐeσταἰ. πωT ς) to another.” οὖ[ ν ταὖQ τoM ν; οx τἰ μή) of soulf  ὖx λή) of soul καíος) to another.” ἐἰ[δος) to another.” τo  τaM ττον, αQ λλ'ἐἰ[δος) to another.” μoM νον καíος) to another.” δuM ναμἰς) to another.”, καíος) to another.” ἐQνἐJρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temγἐἰα δἐὖτἐJρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temα, μἐταf  νοὖT ν ἐQστἰ ψὖχή) of soulJ · τo  δἐf  τoM δἐ μἐταf  τoM δἐ  ἐQν τοἰTς) to another.”πρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temαJ γμασἰν οὖQ  δὖναμἐJνοἰς) to another.” αx μα παJ ντα.”
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power is sensible Nature. Hence, “the distinction between the active ordering andthe resultant order has to be withdrawn,” as Manchester explains.131 In Ennead III.7 then, Plotinus comes to identify this silent power of Soul withTime. As I argued before, for Plotinus, Time is not simple succession, the ‘this afterthat.’ As Baracat notes, mere succession would manifest nothing but an unintelli-gible array of appearances; only if the ordering principle  (Time) is ontologicallyprior and present in Soul can succession be interpreted as a manifestation of thisprinciple.132 So, Time is not the mere succession of the temporally structured phe-nomena; it is “the power of constant  arrival  in succession,” as Manchester putsit.133 But this power does not belong to sensible Nature, but to the λογοἰJ, the intel-lectual unities in Soul; and the λογοἰJ have this power through the activity of Soul.Halfwassen calls this constant arrival the futurity of Soul, it is Soul’s nature to al-ways go to something that she has not had before.134 Since she is not all togetherone with her contents, in that she does not have them all at once like Intellect, she
131 Manchester, “Time and the Soul,” 122.132 Baracat, “Soul’s Desire,” 33. 133 Manchester, “Time and Soul,” 123.134 Halfwassen, Plotin und der Neuplatonismus, 107-108. Futurity, here, means that Soul is directedat something she does not yet possess.  Yet,  this “not yet” is not to be understood in temporalterms. The λογοἰJ, which Soul perceives discursively, are always already in Soul (for outside of Soulthere is nothing.) But Soul does not relate to her contents as Intellect does – whereas Intellect andthe intelligibles are immediate, Soul needs the mediation of discursivity to see the λογοἰJ. And dis -cursivity, or dianoetic intellection, is nothing else than going through the forms one by one, insteadof having them all at once. We might say that the forms are opaque for Soul, so she must considerthem individually (whereas for the Intellect they are transparent.) Hence, Soul’s futurity is to beunderstood metaphysically, not temporally. It is, nevertheless, Soul’s metaphysical futurity which
causes the temporal dispersion of all Nature below Soul.
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can only establish her unity by never ceasing to go from the contemplation of oneform to the next:
For  this  is  the  way in  which it  will  imitate  that  which is  already awhole, already all together and unbounded, by intending to be alwaysmaking an increase in its being, for this is how its being will imitate thebeing of the intelligible world.135
Following from all this, we can now say that the structure of Time is most in-tricately involved in the structure of Soul’s twofoldness. Time sits precisely at thenode of Soul’s higher and lower end.136 It relates the creative higher Soul with thecreated lower soul; even more, Time is the creative power by which Soul creates.And the  stylistic  trope of  silence,  which Plotinus  uses  for  both Soul’s  creativepower and Time, corroborates the reading that Plotinus actually identifies Soul’spower with Time.After these preliminary remarks, we can now move towards Plotinus’ mainline of argumentation for Time as the life of Soul.:
one might perhaps (even if the Muses did exist then after all) ask timewhen he has come into being to tell us how it did come into being andappear.  He might say something like this about himself;  that before,when he had not yet, in fact produced this ‘before’ or felt the need ofthe ‘after,’  he was at rest with eternity in real being; he was not yettime, but he himself kept quiet in that. But since there was a restlessly
135 Enn. III.7. 11. 56-59: “Οὖx τω γαf ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, tem μἰμή) of soulJ σἐταἰ τo  ή) of soule δή) of soul οx λον καíος) to another.” αQ θρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temoM ον καíος) to another.” αe πἐἰρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temον ή) of soule δή) of soul, ἐἰQ ἐQθἐλή) of soulJ σἐἰαQ ἐíος) to another.” πρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temοσκτωJ μἐνον ἐἰ[ναἰ ἐQν τωTw  ἐἰ[ναἰ· καíος) to another.” γαf ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, tem το ἐἰ[ναἰ οὖx τω τo  ἐQκἐíος) to another.”Mνοὖ μἰμή) of soulJ σἐταἰ.”136 Manchester, “Time and the Soul,” 123.
70
active nature, which wanted to control herself and be on her own, andchose to seek for more than her present state, she moved, and timemoved with her; and so, always moving on to the ‘next’ and the ‘after,’and what is not the same, but one thing after another, we made a longstretch of our journey and constructed time as an image of eternity.137
Again, we see how Plotinus follows the structure that we have now outlined.According to Manchester, Plotinus makes two interwoven points. The first part ofthe argument, which I quoted above, is concerned with how Time came into being(γἐνοJ μἐνος) to another.”); the second part will outline how Time appears (ἐQκφανἐἰTς) to another.”) withinsensible Nature.  Until  now, I  have,  following Manchester,  made sure to specify
sensible Nature every time I mentioned φὖJ σἰς) to another.”, since this is the context of the dis-cussion in Ennead III.8. But the “restless active nature” staging a play with Time isnot the sensible Nature, but the higher Nature of Soul, the hypostatic Soul (παT σαψὖχή) of soulJ ). And when Soul starts to move, and Time moves with her, she constructshim as the “image of eternity.” Therefore, as we said, Time is not constructed asexternal to Soul, but as “the image of eternity, that is to say, as an intelligible formof perfection which, when added to the sensible universe, makes it a better imageof its paradigm, not a worse one,” as Manchester explains.138 Time coincides with
137 Enn.  III.7.  11.  9-19:  “αQ λλ'  ἰeσως) to another.”,  ἐeπἐρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, tem  ή) of soul[ σαν  καíος) to another.”  αἰp  ΜοὖT σαἰ  τoM τἐ,  αὖQ τo ν  δ'  αe ν  τἰς) to another.”  τaM χα  τo νγἐνoM μἐνον  χρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temoM νον,  οx πως) to another.” ἐQστíος) to another.”Mν  ἐQκφανἐíος) to another.”ς) to another.”  καíος) to another.”  γἐνoM μἐνος) to another.”.  ΛἐJγοἰ  δ'  αe ν  πἐρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temíος) to another.”  αὖQ τοὖT  ωv δἐJ  πως) to another.”·  ωp ς) to another.”πρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temoM τἐρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temον, πρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temíος) to another.”ν τo  πρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temoM τἐρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temον δή) of soulf  τοὖT το γἐννή) of soulT σαἰ καíος) to another.” τοὖT  ὖp στἐJρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temον δἐή) of soulθή) of soulT ναἰ, οὖf ν αὖQ τωTw  ἐQν τωTw  οe ντἰαQ νἐπαuM ἐτο χρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temoM νος) to another.” οὖQ κ ωe ν, αQ λλ' ἐQν ἐQκἐíος) to another.”Mνωw  καíος) to another.” αὖQ τo ς) to another.” ή) of soulp σὖχíος) to another.”Mαν ή) of soul[ γἐ. Φúσεως δὲ πολυπρáγμονος καìuM σἐως) to another.” δἐf  πολὖπρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temaMγμονος) to another.” καíος) to another.”αe ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temχἐἰν αὖQ τή) of soulT ς) to another.” βíος) to another.”οὖλομἐJνή) of soulς) to another.” καíος) to another.” ἐἰ[ναἰ αὖQ τή) of soulT ς) to another.” καíος) to another.” τo  πλἐJον τοὖT  παρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temoM ντος) to another.” ζή) of soulτἐἰTν ἐpλομἐJνή) of soulς) to another.” ἐQκἰνή) of soulJ θή) of soul μἐfναὖQ τή) of soulJ , ἐQκἰνή) of soulJ θή) of soul δἐf  καíος) to another.” αὖQ τoM ς) to another.”, καíος) to another.” ἐἰQς) to another.” τo  ἐeπἐἰτα αQ ἐíος) to another.” καíος) to another.” τo  ὖp στἐρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temον καíος) to another.” οὖQ  ταὖQ τoM ν, αQ λλ' ἐxτἐρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temον ἐἰ[θ'ἐxτἐρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temον κἰνοuM μἐνοἰ, μή) of soulT κoM ς) to another.” τἰ τή) of soulT ς) to another.” πορóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temἐíος) to another.”Mας) to another.” ποἰή) of soulσaMμἐνοἰ αἰQωT νος) to another.” ἐἰQκoM να τo ν χρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temoM νον ἐἰQρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temγaMσμἐθα.”138 Manchester, “Time and the Soul,” 125.
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Soul’s self-origination; even more, since Time expresses Soul’s nature – her being-directed towards the future – he makes her self-origination possible in the firstplace. Only because Time originates a metaphysical structure of before and aftercan Soul have her discursive nature apart from the Intellect.Plotinus follows this mythical origin of Time with his explanation of howTime appears. Again, I alter Armstrong’s translation to make the pronominal rela-tions clearer. Until now, the two actors were Soul’s Nature and Time; now, they areSoul’s power (feminine) and the Logos (masculine).
For  because  soul  had  an  unquiet  power,  which  wanted  to  keep  ontransferring what she saw there to something else, she did not wantthe whole to be present to it all together; and, as from a quiet seed theformative  principle  [the  Logos],  unfolding  himself,  advances,  as  hethinks, to largeness, but does away with the largeness by division and,instead of keeping his unity in himself,  squanders it outside himselfand so goes forward to a weaker extension; in the same way Soul, mak-ing the world of sense in imitation of that other world, moving with amotion which is not that which exists There, but like it, and intendingto be an image of it, first of all put herself into time, which she made in-stead of eternity, and then handed over that which came into being as aslave to time, by making the whole of it exist in time and encompassingall its ways with time.139
139 Enn. III.7.  11.  20-33:  “Επἐíος) to another.”  γαf ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, tem  ψὖχή) of soulT ς) to another.”  ή) of soul[ ν  τἰς) to another.”  δuM ναμἰς) to another.” οὖQ χ  ή) of soulx σὖχος) to another.”,  τo  δ'  ἐQκἐἰT  οp ρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temωJ μἐνον αQ ἐíος) to another.”μἐταφἐJρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temἐἰν  ἐἰQς) to another.”  αe λλο βíος) to another.”οὖλομἐJνή) of soulς) to another.”,  τo  μἐfν  αQ θρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temoM ον αὖQ τῇT  παT ν  παρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temἐἰTναἰ  οὖQ κ  ή) of soule θἐλἐν·  ωx σπἐρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, tem δ'  ἐQκσπἐJρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temματος) to another.” ή) of soulp σuM χοὖ ἐQξἐλíος) to another.”Mττων αὖp τo ν οp  λoM γος) to another.” δἰἐJξοδον ἐἰQς) to another.” πολuM , ωp ς) to another.” οἰeἐταἰ, ποἰἐἰT, αQ φανíος) to another.”Mζων τo  πολὖfτωTw  μἐρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temἰσμωTw , καíος) to another.” αQ νθ' ἐpνo ς) to another.” ἐQν αὖp τωTw  οὖQ κ ἐQν αὖp τωTw  τo  ἐzν δαπανωT ν ἐἰQς) to another.” μή) of soulT κος) to another.” αQ σθἐνἐJστἐρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temον πρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temoM ἐἰσἰν,οὖx τω δή) of soulf  καíος) to another.”  αὖQ τή) of soulf  κoM σμον ποἰοὖT σα αἰQσθή) of soulτo ν μἰμή) of soulJ σἐἰ ἐQκἐíος) to another.”Mνοὖ κἰνοuM μἐνον κíος) to another.”Mνἐσἰν οὖQ  τή) of soulf ν  ἐQκἐἰT,οp μοíος) to another.”Mαν δἐf  τῇT  ἐQκἐἰT  καíος) to another.”  ἐQθἐJλοὖσαν ἐἰQκoM να ἐQκἐíος) to another.”Mνή) of soulς) to another.” ἐἰ[ναἰ, πρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temωT τον μἐfν ἐpαὖτή) of soulf ν ἐQχρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temoM νωσἐν αQ ντíος) to another.”  τοὖTαἰQωT νος) to another.” τοὖT τον ποἰή) of soulJ σασα· ἐeπἐἰτα δἐf  καíος) to another.” τωTw  γἐνομἐJνωw  ἐhδωκἐ δοὖλἐuM ἐἰν χρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temoM νωw , ἐQν χρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temoM νωw  αὖQ τo νπαJ ντα ποἰή) of soulJ σασα ἐἰ[ναἰ, ταf ς) to another.” τοuM τοὖ δἰἐξoM δοὖς) to another.” αp παJ σας) to another.” ἐQν αὖQ τωTw  πἐρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temἰλαβíος) to another.”οὖT σα.”
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At the end of the passage, we see the doubled act of Soul again: first she temporal-izes herself, then she puts all her creations into Time as well. Plotinus is not say-ing here that Soul herself is temporal. By “temporalizing herself” he refers to theconcurrent origination of Soul and Time. Soul breaks free from the Intellect and inthis act Time occurs as Soul’s discursive activity. That Soul makes all her produc-tions enslaved to Time, on the other hand, means that sensible Nature is subjectto temporality, it is characterized by temporal succession. In this way, Time is notonly psychical,  but also physical;  it  is  not just  the epistemological  structure ofSoul’s contemplation, but also an ontological structure of reality.140 Time is the on-tological structure of the hypostatic Soul, temporality the structure of phenom-enal reality. Here, we see the twofold nature of Soul and Time most clearly: in herinward contemplation of the intelligible forms Soul, unlike Intellect, must proceedin a forward movement, going from one form to the next – this is her dianoeticactivity, which Plotinus’ calls Time. This inward contemplation produces an out-ward creation, sensible Nature, which is ordered, according to Soul’s mode of con-templation – in a temporal manner, one thing after another.The actions of the Logos in the quoted passage above further support this in-terpretation.  As we established,  each hypostatic  reality  in  Plotinus’  ontological
140 Halfwassen says, “die Zeit ist fu r Plotin nicht nur wie fu r Kant die Form unserer subjektivenAnschauung,  sondern  zugleich  die  objektive  ontologische  Struktur  der  Welt  des  Werdens.”Halfwassen, Plotin und der Neuplatonismus, 109.
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hierarchy receives from above its own Nature, but is also productive of what is be-low. It is Soul’s nature to contemplate the intelligible forms through Time – oneafter another – and in this contemplation the forms, which are unified in the Intel-lect, are drawn apart (δἰαJ στασἰς) to another.”) and become the λοJγοἰ. When these are material-ized in Soul’s outward activity and become sensible Nature, they are no longercapable of creation, since Nature has here reached the bottom of the hypostaticrealities. Sensible Nature is, therefore, no ὖp ποJ στασἰς) to another.” herself; she is only created,but does not create. In Soul, however, the Logos is still powerful, and this powerseems to come from Soul’s temporalization. Manchester summarizes his positionas follows:
It seems to be Soul’s temporalizing herself that gives her Power, so thatthe making of Time as an image of eternity that attended the establish-ment of Soul as a Nature in argument 1 is the very thing that gives herPower her in argument 2.141
We need to always remember that Plotinus’ theory of Time is not meant tobe taken literally. Time’s emergence from Soul’s fall is a myth that Plotinus uses toillustrate metaphysical  principles.  “Although the  text  says  that  the  Soul  after aperiod of rest chose to seek a fuller life and started to move, the truth is that thiscurious power of the Soul has always been active,” as Clark explains.142 As I said in
141 Manchester, “Time and the Soul,” 127.142 Clark, “Time in Plotinus,” 353.
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the introduction of this section, the theory of Time follows Plotinus’ ontologicalphilosophizing in this aspect; also the theory of the emanation of the principles ofreality out of the One takes the shape of a myth. Both of these narratives are inter-twined with each other, to the point that the treatise on time can actually be seenas a highly sophisticated exploration of the powers and doings of Soul. Time, in-deed, is deeply involved in the mythical creation of the sensible by Soul. For once,Time is the mode of contemplation through which Soul’s creativity finds its ex-pression. But, more than that, Time is also the copula between Soul’s creativityand her creations. Through his concept of Time, Plotinus is able to describe thecontinuity of the procession of Being from the higher to the lower Nature of Soul.In other words, Time mitigates and unifies the twofoldness of Soul, her higher cre-ative and lower created Nature. For this reason, Time itself is twofold in the sameway. At its ontological summit, Time is the activity of Soul, her discursive contem-plation.  At  its  lower  end,  Time  expresses  itself  as  the  temporal  succession inwhich the contemplation of Soul is expressed as sensible Nature.We can understand why Plotinus holds this approach to be superior to theopinions he refutes. His own theory solves, at least in his mind, a very specificproblem. Yet, it is the problem with which, I believe, his philosophizing as a wholeis always concerned; it is the issue of the relation between unity and multiplicity.Plotinus philosophical project is centred around finding an adequate expressionfor how the kosmos can be one, albeit expressed in a multiplicity of phenomena.
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His treatment of Soul and Time have a significant role in this endeavour; theirtwofold Natures constitute the link between the unity of Being and the dispersedbeings; Soul is nothing else than the principle of dispersion that must stand as amediation between them, Time is more accurately the activity of dispersion that isexpressed through the principle Soul. In this way, Plotinus not only establishes a
kosmos of multiples  out of unity, he is, moreover, able to think Soul and Time asunified within this outgoing procession. In his opinion, his predecessors failed todo that – although we might mention that their projects may have had differentagendas.
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CHAPTER 4 CONCLUSION
Plotinus is ever concerned about one fundamental  question: how can the
kosmos be one if all we experience is multiplicity? Plotinus tries to answer thisquestion by establishing an intricate ontological  hierarchy.  In section 2.1,  I  fo-cused  on how the  hypostatic  Soul  is  in  the  centre  of  this  hierarchy.  The  Soulprovides the mediation between between unity and multiplicity. Since the modein which Soul contemplates Being is discursive, Soul introduces discursivity intoBeing, as well. Plotinus’ hypostatic Soul is, therefore, a principle of reality; it en-sures that he can conceptualize reality as both unified and multiple, both of whichare necessary for the kosmos to be intelligible. Since our rational apparatus worksdiscursively, our reality must possess a discursive structure, as well. Yet, this dis-cursive structure relies on a deeper metaphysical unity. Only thus can the  rela-
tions between  the  multiple  things,  on  which  rational  thought  relies,  be  real.Without unity, the kosmos would fall apart into singulars which are unintelligibleas well.Of course, this is not the only theory of reality, nor is it the only valid one. Itis the one that Plotinus proposes – and it certainly has several philosophical ad-vantages. One of these can be seen in Plotinus’ theory of time, which is consistentwith the rest of his ontology. By defining Time as the mode of Soul’s contempla-tion, as her discursivity which disperses Being into multiplicity, Plotinus is able toprovide a highly consistent theory of time. Moreover, the ontological unity of time
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is preserved because Plotinus is able to separate Time as the principle of disper-sion from the succession of phenomena. I have agreed with Plotinus in the previous chapter, that other accounts oftime do not make this distinction. They make time into something that followsphenomenal change in one way or another. According to those opinions, time is al-ways ultimately broken apart because it must follow the structure of dispersedphenomena – hence, time will be dispersed as well. This might not be a problemat all if we are not concerned with preserving the unity of time. Yet, I would like toargue that, first,  a theory that preserves the unity of its object is always bettersuited to explain the respective object.  Second,  our  experience of  the temporalflow is indeed one; the succession with which we are faced at every moment is un-broken.143Hence, it seems simply intuitive that our theory of time should reflect thisunity. Plotinus eludes the problem of dispersing time by conceptualizing Time asthe cosmological principle of dispersion, yet not as part of that dispersion. As I
143 Someone might suggest here that our experience of temporality may, contrary to what I amproposing, indeed have certain gaps. Examples for these gaps could be sleep, or meditation, mo-ments in which we are not aware of the passage of time. Yet, first, this does not undermine the ar-gument that  when we experience temporality we experience it as continuous. We do not experi-ence distinct moments following each other, we cannot really distinguish between one “now” andthe next. The nows, so to speak, continuously melt into each other. Second, I would like to suggestthat even those spans of time that we arguably do not experience – for example if we are asleep –do not constitute real “gaps” in our experience of temporality.  We are immediately aware thatchange has happened, and time has passed as soon as we wake up. Moreover, we experience this“gap” not as something that stopped the temporal flow for a while, the gap rather becomes a mo-ment within this flow, something of which we are aware in an immediate way.
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proposed, this distinction between Time and succession makes Plotinus’ theorybetter suited to preserve both the logical consistency and the ontological unity oftime than are the other opinions that he considers. Plotinus succeeds in arguingthe superiority of his own approach by posing it as the solution to issues that areraised in the critique of the opinions of his predecessors. All of these other theor-ies may try to meet the criteria of conceptual consistency and ontological unity aswell. Yet, Plotinus shows how they all ultimately fail because they try to place timein the phenomenal instead of placing the phenomenal in time.I dealt, here, with the opinions that time is motion; that time is that which ismoved; that time is the interval of a motion; and that time is the measure or num-ber of motion. What all these views have in common is that they conceptualizetime as appearing together with phenomenal movement. Plotinus is able to criti-cize these opinions by showing that they all lead into either logical or ontologicalcontradictions. This is because phenomenal movement  presupposes  a concept oftime, as Plotinus points out in every one of the refutations of other opinions. Forthis reason, we cannot identify time and movement with each other. The view thattime is that which is moved falls flat for the same reason. Since movement presup-poses time, that which is moved does so all the more. Zeno’s view that time is the distance covered by motion, i.e. an interval, re-ceives a little more intricate critique. Ultimately, Plotinus asserts that to identifytime with this interval will  inevitably reduce time either to movement itself,  a
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view that has already been refuted, or conflate time with space. The latter claimseems somewhat more straightforward: the distance covered by a (loco)motionwill  certainly  be  spatial.  Yet,  there  is  also  a  certain  amount  of  time  which  iscovered by a particular movement – be it locomotion or another form of change.Refuting this view, Plotinus asks what exactly the movement or movements are ofwhich time is supposed to be the interval. If it is just any motion, then we face theproblem that there must be multiple times just as there are multiple different mo-tions. If it is solely the movement of the kosmos, we can avoid this problem, yet,we are now presented with a different predicament; the distance that a movementcovers, if not understood spatially, is not distinct from the movement itself, unlesswe want to say that that there is a temporal distance that the movement coversand identify this temporal distance with time. But this would assert that time istime, a statement quite true, yet certainly a useless explanation of what time is. This argument, just as the arguments against time as movement and time asthe moved, operates in a purely logical way; it reduces the view under attack to anabsurdity. What is at the base of this absurdity is Plotinus’ discovery that timecannot successfully be conceptualized as something that shows up together withappearances – be it as phenomenal movement, as something in movement, or asan interval of movement. All these views must fall prey to the logical problem thatwe must  presuppose a concept of time before we can meaningfully speak of mo-tion. Plotinus sees that to solve this issue he must make time prior to movement,
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at least, in a first step, conceptually. That is what he means when he says thatmovement is  in  time. He admits that, intuitively, movement is closely related totemporality, but he calls this temporality the succession of the appearances anddivorces it from his concept of Time, which he conceptualizes as the principle thatmakes this succession possible.But Time cannot only be conceptually prior for Plotinus. Time is, for him, aprinciple that makes succession possible by dispersing the unity of the intelligibleBeing. Hence, Time has an ontological priority as well; it is a cosmological and cos-mogonical principle with a crucial role to play in the Plotinean emanation. By dif-ferentiating between Time and temporality,  Plotinus not only tries to solve theconceptual issue of the relation between time and motion; he also tackles the is-sue of how to reflect the ontological unity of time in his theory. He sets out toachieve this goal in the same way in which he tackled his conceptual concerns: bycriticizing a famous predecessor. This time it is Aristotle who serves as a spring-board for Plotinus’ approach. That Plotinus utilizes Aristotle in this way is not sur-prising. Aristotle’s account demonstrates a great effort to ensure the unity of time,which makes it easy for Plotinus to engage with this precise topic through a cri-tique of the Stagirite’s position. He argues that Aristotle’s view is ultimately un-able to explain why the measuring number is, indeed, a continuous measure oftemporality instead of just any aggregation of numeric units.
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Aristotle defines time as the number or measure of movement according tobefore and after. What he means by that is that time is a certain aspect of move-ment,  namely the aspect that makes a particular movement  countable.  What issupposedly counted are instants or stages of the movement which follow eachother in the way that one instant is before and one is after. Aristotle, moreover, re-cognizes that we experience the temporal flux as continuous and places great sig-nificance on the question of why that is. He answers that time is continuous be-cause  it  is  an  aspect  of  a  continuous  movement.  In  a  second  step,  Aristotlegrounds the continuity of movement by asserting that any particular movementhappens in and over a certain extent of space, which, in his opinion, is evidentlycontinuous. Plotinus criticizes this definition because it is not clear why this number ofmotion, which Aristotle defines as time, is temporal and not just any kind of num-ber. He points out that if time is supposed to measure movement, it needs to havea certain magnitude and that it is not clear why this magnitude should be any-thing else than an accumulation of numeric units or, in other words, distinct mo-ments that are, indeed, not continuous. Moreover, Plotinus asks how time is actu-ally doing the measuring simply by running along with motion. In this scenario itwould be as plausible to affirm that time measures motion as that motion meas-ures time, since the two are always moving with each other. But even if it wereclear that the line running along with movement is actually measuring this move-
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ment there would still be one issue left to consider: if time were to be this line ormagnitude it would only ever occur with particular movements. In this case, weare actually defining a specific portion of time and not time itself. Moreover, wecan even look back to Plotinus’ earlier criticisms and assert that movement mustpresuppose time – hence, it cannot occur only when motion is happening. We ex-
perience time – or, rather, temporality – when movement occurs, but that does notmean that time is dependent on movement. Aristotle says that time is an aspect of movement, namely, that aspect thatmakes  movement  countable  according to  what  comes before  and what  comesafter. Yet, there are two different meanings of what is before and what after in amovement; it can refer to places in space or moments in time. Aristotle acknow-ledges this problematic and asserts that time measures motion in accordance tothe temporal before and after. He, then, nevertheless relates the temporal beforeand after intimately with the spatial one, since he grounds the continuity of thetemporal moments in the continuity of space. Plotinus does not accept this solu-tion and seems to hold that time cannot be related to space in this way, since thetemporal before and after must be prior to the spatial one.That time must have priority over space for Plotinus can already be deducedfrom his criticisms against the other views of time concerning logical consistency.He points out that if, as Aristotle seems to assert, the temporal before and after isthe temporal aspect of a movement in space, i.e. in the spatial before and after,
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then time is presupposed before the explanation of what time is. The argument iscircular. We may assume that time is not something distinct from movement – aline running along with it or the magnitude of this line – but an aspect of themovement itself, namely, the aspect that makes the movement countable. For thisreason, Aristotle insisted that time is a number that is counted, not a number bywhich we count. But, according to Plotinus’ criticism, it does not really matter iftime is a measure because it can be counted or because it is a tool which we canuse to count the magnitude of movement. What matters is that in either case whatis counted can only be distinct units that, when added up, constitute an accumula-tion of moments, but not a unified flux. Concerning the ontological  unity of time, for Plotinus,  there are only twopossibilities. Either we simply do not care about it and are content with a theorythat does not give heed to the unification of its concept of time. Or we must taketime out of the phenomenal altogether. Phenomena are always already dispersed;their nature is multiplicity. If we tie the concept of time to this multiplicity, it willinevitably  follow  this  characteristic  and  be  itself  multiple  and  dispersed.  Ofcourse, we have to point out that for Plotinus the multiplicity of the phenomenalin general can only be properly unified by deriving it from the principle of ulti -mate unity. Platonism is characterized by the prioritizing of unity over multipli-city. Yet, this approach has philosophical advantages, one of which is that, if weare interested in a concept of unified time, we can achieve this goal with relative
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ease by defining time as a principle of phenomenal multiplicity, instead of as partof it. Plotinus does precisely that: for him, Time is the cosmological activity thatdraws the unity of Being apart into distinct entities, through which our discursivereasoning can now move one after another. He distinguishes Time from the tem-poral succession that we experience; that temporality is how Time is expressed inthe phenomenal realm, and it is subjected to Time, in the sense that it is caused byTime. Time has, therefore, a most important role to play in the mediation betweenunity and multiplicity, in which Plotinus is so interested. Soul is the principle ofthe dispersion of Being; through her contemplation she draws the unity of Beingapart into rational unities. Time is the mode of this contemplation of Soul, whichdraws the intelligible out into discursivity by contemplating the intelligibles oneafter  another.  This  Time-like  contemplation  of  Being  is  what  causes  sensibleNature,  the backdrop manifestation of Soul’s contemplation,  to move in a phe-nomenal expression of Soul’s Time-activity: the sensible moves in temporal suc-cession. After all this, we can also understand why Plotinus thinks it is necessary fur-ther to ground Time in eternity. I have not discussed the parts of Ennead III.7 thatdeal with eternity in this thesis because I want to show that Plotinus’ view is aconsistent theory without the derivation of time from eternity; his theory is inten-ded to solve a specific set of problems and, I believe, it succeeds in doing that. But
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it makes sense that if Time is the dispersive activity of Soul, then Being needs tobe unified, i.e. not dispersed, prior to that.144 Indeed, Being is unified in the higherprinciple, Intellect. And just as Time is the contemplative activity of Soul that dis-
perses Being, so is eternity the contemplative activity of Intellect that  unifies  Be-ing, or, as Plotinus says, the life of Intellect, which is “a life that abides in the same,and always has the all present to it.”145 Just as the life of Soul, Time, is character-ized by the ontological gap between the contemplation and the contemplated, sois the life of Intellect, eternity, characterized by the absence of that gap. It alwayshas the all present to it and thereby ensures the unity of Being which Soul dis-perses. Considering the relation between the unity and multiplicity of Being thereis, therefore, more work to be done concerning the unity of Being in the eternalIntellect.  Yet,  this is  a project for the future.  In this thesis,  I  only propose thatPlotinus’ theory of Time, the life-activity of Soul, offers a consistent account thatensures the conceptual and ontological unity of time and that it plays a vital rolein the continuity of the emanation of Being.
144 “Prior” here means metaphysically prior, not temporally prior.145 Enn. III.7. 3. 15-18: “ταὖT τα πaM ντα ἰQδωf ν αἰQωT να ἐἰ[δἐν ἰQδωf ν ζωή) of soulf ν μἐJνοὖσαν ἐQν τωTw  αὖQ τωTw  αQ ἐíος) to another.” παρóνος). I will show that, for Plotinus, temo ντo  παT ν ἐeχοὖσαν.”
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